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ABSTRACT
This is a dissertation on the evolution of 
maritime activities in the Republic of Panama and 
on the possibilities of increasing the benefits that 
the country derives from them during the period 1986- 
2000 and beyond. It has been written to allow Pana­
manians to take a look at their national maritime 
history and institutions, and to try to lend them 
the intellectual tools for devising ways in which 
to foster the growth of these activities in the coun­
try.
In the document we present a very strict 
conceptual framework, that is, that this disserta­
tion has been written within the context of the Uni­
ted Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,1982 
and the Panamanian Government's current economic and 
social development strategy. The body of the disser­
tation itself is composed of three parts, although 
these are not identified as such, which are: Panama's 
maritime background, the Strategy for National Mari­
time Development that lies at the heart of this ef­
fort, and a description of the current situation and 
perspectives of each one of the major components of 
the national maritime sector, as we have defined it 
herein.
With this dissertation we wish to underscore 
the fact that Panama is a Maritime Nation and that, 
despite the haphazard way in which its maritime act-
ivities seem to have developed, through a correct 
application of remedies,- including extensive train 
ing of marine personnel, reinforcement of infrastruc 
tures, and a strengthening of the "healthy climate" 
for investments in maritime affairs -- Panama will 
be able to achieve its full maritime development by 
the target year 2000. The achievement of strategic 
goals outlined as part of our Strategy, moreover, 
should pave the way for Panama to make the best use 
possible of its number one natural resource, its 
unique geographical position and configuration, for 
improving the standard of living of its people and 
for supporting the diversification of the national 
economic structure into other export-oriented areas
i V
of human endeavour.
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INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Panama is a small developing 
country located between 77° and 83° W and 7° and 10°N, 
approximately in the middle of the American continent. 
(See Figure 1). To most people perhaps it is just one 
of the Central American "banana" republics. To traders 
and shipping people, however, Panama is one of the 
great crossroads of the world, an S-shaped isthmus 80 
kilometers at its narrowest and 193 at its widest that 
has facilitated trade over centuries.
In a world increasingly characterized by the 
awareness of nations of the importance of maritime af­
fairs for their economic and social development, as 
well as by their just demands to gain greater parti­
cipation in such affairs, an analysis of maritime de­
velopments in the Republic of Panama is not only appro 
priate but necessary. As the country with the world's 
second largest merchant fleet under its flag, Panama's 
handling of its open registry is constantly scrutinize 
not to say attacked, by a variety of interests. As the 
country that hosts one of the world's three major in- 
teroceanic waterways, the Panama Canal, Panama is also 
the target of attention and concern. Yet despite the 
apparent acknowledgement of its importance for world 
trade and development, an understanding of the reasons
2Fig. 1. Panama's Geographical Location
3why this small Third World nation commands such a key 
role seems to escape even the most learned of shipping 
men.
Panama 2000; A Strategy for National Maritime 
Development is a dissertation on the evolution of Pa­
namanian maritime activities and on the possibility 
of increasing the benefits they generate over the next 
fifteen years. We have written it to allow Panamanians 
to take a necessary look into their own maritime deve­
lopment in a historical perspective, and to lend them 
the intellectual tools for analyzing the present and 
for planning the future. With this work we hope to pave 
the way for an increase in the economic activity that 
accompanies growth in the maritime sector, and to see 
the country steadily develop into a full maritime nation 
by the year 2000.
On the basis of our stated goal, we have struct­
ured the body of this dissertation around three basic 
levels of analysis: a chronology of the evolution of 
maritime activities in the Republic of Panama; a des- 
cription of the National Maritime Development Strategy 
that lies at the heart of this dissertation; and a com­
prehensive overview of the national maritime sector, 
including present structures and development trends, 
as well as our ideas on how the country can work to 
improve thesector ' s present economic performance by 
implementing the strategy we propose.
Following this Introduction, the reader will 
find, first, a chapter discussing Panama's maritime
4background. We then proceed to introduce our strategy 
for national maritime development in the Republic of 
Panama; we do this by first giving a comprehensive 
overview of the economic and social performance indi­
cators of the national maritime sector as a whole, 
before detailing the set of goals that we have used 
here to define our strategy. The latter are listed 
individually and can be said to usually apply to one 
of the components of the national maritime sector, al­
though there is some overlapping in the goals because 
of the intrinsic interrelatedness of maritime affairs.
The following chapters deal at some length 
with the different maritime activities that are carried 
out in the Republic of Panama. The chapters are generally 
divided into a description of the present situation and 
a look into how the strategic goal(s) defined for the 
specific activity can be put into practice. In this way 
we discuss Human Resources, The Open Registry Fleet,
The National Ports, National Maritime Ancillary Indus­
tries, The Panama Canal and Fishing.
In dealing with subject matter we have outlined 
in the preceding paragraphs, we have obviously strived 
to adhere to the objectivity that must characterize all 
research papers such as this one. Our work has been af­
fected, nevertheless, by the general lack of hard facts, 
especially as regards the economic and social perform­
ance of the different activities and industries, and by 
the virtually total absence of publicly-available govern­
ment policy statements regarding' our topic.
5Another limitation we must signal here refers 
to the conceptual framework under which we have produced 
this dissertation. This has not been an exercise in 
free-thinking, but rather an attempt to make develop­
ments in Panamanian maritime affairs begin to fall into 
a more coherent, formal pattern. We believe this is 
the only way to approach development in any field, and 
that this focusing on goals and concepts, and on long- 
range planning as per internationally-accepted standards 
is the best step forward.
As a consequence of the above, after much re­
search and consultation with experts in the field, we 
decided to give our strategy the overall framework of 
both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982 (better known as UNCLOS III) and on the Na­
tional Development Strategy being implemented by the 
Panamanian Government. As far as UNCLOS III is concern­
ed, we feel it should provide the guidelines for dev­
eloping not only shipping, but all maritime affairs in 
the Republic of Panama, despite the fact that it is an 
instrument not yet in force. This convention represents, 
in our modest opinion, the umbrella legislation that 
can best provide for an orderly exploitation of sea- 
related activities for the benefit of all nations, and 
its concepts are of such a valuable, universal nature 
that they should be embodied in national legislations 
independently of constricting political considerations.
By adhering to the essence of Panama's current 
development strategy, we are basically trying to offer
6our compatriots and decision-makers the opportunity 
to work within existing policies and institutions as 
much as possible, to avoid major disruptions that will 
benefit no one. This does not mean that we do not en­
visage some changes, but these should be of a minor 
character over the next fifteen years, while the ground­
work for solid maritime development is being laid. By 
the year 2000, when the strategic goals we have outlined 
here have been .achieved, the time will be ripe for sug­
gesting and putting into practice administrative or 
other reforms of a greater magnitude.
' This dissertation, then, has been constructed 
around the national economic and social development 
strategy of Panama, and not as a separate or alternate 
idea. We generally agree that the stated goal of improv­
ing the quality of life of the Panamanian people by inc­
reasing national wealth and exports via the exploitation 
of new and traditional sources of revenue, by integrat­
ing the country socially and regionally, by strengthen­
ing its institutions, and by developing further the na­
tional identity is a sound development strategy for our 
country, given its particular historical and geographical 
conditions.^ We believe, furthermore, that the centering 
of our economy around the tertiary sector as a way of 
generating the income needed to sustain our young and 
fast-growing population and to obtain the seed capital 
for future diversification is not only wise, but perhaps 
the only alternative we have. Due to this fact, in this 
document we do not touch upon the extremely controver-
7sial issues surrounding open registries, the inter­
national banking and insurance centers, the Panama 
Canal and other so-called factors of dependency, but 
rather attempt to deal with them in a constructive 
and open manner, simply assuming that discussing these 
issues here would be of no avail in shortening the 
gap between the different points of view and that, in 
the meantime, the world.cannot stop and the Panamanian 
people have a right to continue existing and prospering 
to the degree that they contribute to world society.
We finally wish to mention in this introductory 
section, that this dissertation must be considered only 
as a preliminary attempt at understanding the complexi­
ties of "Panama, a Maritime Nation". As a pioneer work 
in this field, we have only been able to briefly study 
institutions and their development, but we feel that 
there is ample room for further research work by Pana­
manians interested in maritime affairs, especially in 
the following areas: the role and potential impact of 
national seafarers within the Panamanian economy; the 
real costs of training for Panama's full maritime dev­
elopment; the role of maritime training as an effective 
means for the transfer of technology to Panama; the 
optimum maritime administration setup for Panama; and 
guidelines for implementation of UNCLOS III by the Re­
public of Panama.
CHAPTER ONE
PANAMA'S MARITIME BACKGROUND
Although not always a major shipping nation, 
the Republic of Panama does have a 500-year long trad­
ition of close association with the seas, a fact that 
undoubtedly allows us to state that it is a maritime 
nation. From its humble origins in the small fishing 
village of "Pannaba", which means "abundance of fish" 
in native Indian language, Panama has developed into 
a major maritime Flag and Coastal State where growth 
and progress are somehow always linked to the exploi­
tation of the country's main natural resource - its 
geographic position and configuration - via the seas 
and sea-related activities.
The Colonial Period (1501 - 1821)
The Republic of Panama wa? discovered in 1501 
by the Spanish conquistador Rodrigo de Bastidas and 
visited by Christopher Columbus in 1502. Since its 
discovery, awareness of the strategic position and 
configuration of the Panamanian isthmus began to play 
a preeminent role in national development. It can be 
justly argued^ that the basic features and nature of 
the Panamanian economy were shaped during the early 
colonial years and that it is intimately tied to the
8
9interoceanic transit zone which is, in turn, largely 
determined by the three key geographical factors that 
are uniquely present together in the area: the narrow­
ness of the isthmus, the absence of high mountains, 
and the presence of the Chagres River. These particular 
features of Panama became evident early on: according 
to some historians, the importance of its pass-route 
was already obvious by 1513, right after the discovery 
of the Pacific Ocean by Vasco Nunez de Balboa, who 
first sighted these .waters from a place in the Panama­
nian jungle not distant from the first mainland colony 
founded by Columbus, Santa Marla de Belen.
Its singular features thus defined, Panama 
soon became of vital importance to the Spanish Crown.
In fact, it has been often stated that, although it 
was not a principal productive or mining area, quite 
unlike other regions, Panama was the only one in the 
New World that gained strategic and commercial import­
ance on the sheer basis of its geography.
During the colonial period, Panama was a major 
transshipment center for goods coming and going to and 
from Spain and its American colonies. Passage was ef­
fected through the isthmus via a combination of river 
and road transport, using the Chagres River along its 
navigable course. The embodiment of this role were, how­
ever, the famous "Fairs of Portobelo". Portobelo, a 
Caribbean port founded in 1597, hosted these renowned 
trading fairs until the mid-eighteenth century: "the 
Spanish galleons arrived in Portobelo loaded with wares
10
that were traded for other goods coming from Ecuador, 
P-feru, Chile, Bolivia and Argentina. The fairs lasted
• forty to fifty days and goods worth many millions of
2pesos were traded. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2,
port development in the Pacific and Atlantic coasts
3of Panama was significant for the times.
A further evidence of the fact that Panama 
was increasingly coming to be recognized as a major 
crossroads were the constant attacks on isthmian towns 
by corsairs and pirates. Such attacks led in time to 
the discontinuance of the fairs. The attack on the 
capital city of Panama, led by the English pirate Henry 
Morgan in 1671, and Admiral Vernon's captures of Porto- 
belo in 1739 and of the Fort of San Lorenzo in 1740 are 
particularly sad mementos of such recognition.
The_Col^mMan_Pe r^od_(1821 - 1903)
Panama's maritime development was severely af­
fected when the fairs were discontinued and Spain was 
forced to abandon the route around 1746. Activity did 
not fully recover until almost a century afterwards, 
but there was in the interim a political event that we 
would like to mention here because of its connection 
to what is Panama's destiny as a maritime nation.
Early in the eighteeenth century, with the ad­
vent of the wars of liberation that led to the creation 
of the new Latin American republics, Panama played a 
meaningful role in support of Spain. This situation 
lasted until 1821, when the country declared its own
nFig.2.
Ports Movement in Panama (1544-1812)
EMBARCACIONES ENTRADAS A LOS PUERTOS TERMIRALES
DEL ISTMO DE PANAMA 
1544-Jai2
Source: Enciclopedia De la Cultura .Panamena para Ninos y OSvenes 32, p.4.
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independence and, under the aegisse of the great 
Latin American Liberator, Simon Bolivar, joined the 
newly-formed Federation of the Great Colombia, under 
the name of "Department of the Isthmus".
In 1826, there was a general meeting of Latin 
American countries convened by Bolivar in Panama city. 
During the Anphictionic Congress, The Liberator spoke 
about Panama's uniqueness in the following terms:
"Seems that if the world were to select, its capital, 
the Isthmus of Panama would be chosen for such an august 
destiny, located as it is in the middle of the globe 
(our translation)". Such words, uttered by one of the 
greatest Latin American statesmen of all times, would
4forever seal the destiny of Panama and its people.
Aside from the geopolitical relevance gained 
by Panama because of the political event we described 
above, two other major events that took place during 
the period of union with Colombia served to strengthen 
Panama's maritime development: the discovery of the 
gold mines of California in 1849 and the French initia­
tive to build a canal through the isthmus in 1882.
In the first case, it may be said without fur­
ther elaboration that Panama played a significant role 
in the discovery and exploitation of the California 
gold mines (1849). It became the meeting point of hun­
dreds of eager European and Asian gold-diggers, the fa­
mous "forty-niners"; the place for purchasing the ne­
cessary supplies and equipment for prospecting; the 
place, finally, to find and board one of the crowded
13
ships that would take one to the lucky grounds. In this 
connection, it is worth noting that Panama served the 
needs of these men in an effective way. The first trans­
continental railroad in the American continent was the 
Trans-Isthmian Railroad of Panama, completed in 1855.
In that peak year, twenty-nine million dollars worth 
of California gold was moved through the Panamanian 
railroad.^
French Count Ferdinand De Lesseps' initiative 
to construct a sea-level canal throug- the isthmus of 
Panama was the second maritime event of the Colombian 
Period. Associated with the enterprise at its peak 
growth period in 1888 were 20,000 jobs.® The ill-fated 
French attempt finally collapsed in 1896, due to poor 
administration, disease and great technical limitations.
Between 1896 and 1903, Panamanian economic 
development was severely thwarted by the civil war bet­
ween Colombia's Liberal and Conservative Parties, a 
large share of which was foughton isthmian soil. Hopes 
for recovery after the 1902 peace agreement between the 
two parties vanished when the Colombian Senate rejected 
the draft Herran-Hay Treaty of 1903, whereby Colombia 
would have granted the United States of America the 
right to purchase the French concession rights and to 
build a canal through Panama. Economic depression, 
awareness among Panamanians that Colombia was unable 
to respond to their needs and aspirations, and pressure 
by the United States to begin negotiations quickly were 
the cornerstones of the Panamanian independence move-
14
merit that had been slowly but steadily consolidating 
itself almost since the time the country joined Co­
lombia.
The Republican Period_(1903 to present)
Panama gained its independence from Colombia, 
without bloodshed, on 3 November 1903. Since then, 
perhaps largely as a result of the new role that the 
country came to play after the opening of the Panama 
Canal to world trade, maritime development has accel­
erated. In the years that have passed since indepen­
dence took place, as we shall see now, Panama has been 
always actively seeking to perfect its national inde­
pendence through the rational exploitation of its re­
sources, especially its geographical position. In line 
with these circumstances, the Republican Period is the 
period that has seen the birth of most of present-day 
maritime activities in Panama, including the open reg­
istry fleet, the Panama Canal, and ports and ancillary 
Indus tr ies.
The Panama Canal
Negotiations between the Republic of Panama 
and the United States of America over the granting of 
a concession for the latter to build an interoceanic 
waterway through Panama's territory were already under­
way at the time of Panamanian independence from Colom­
bia. The negotiations were conducted during an espe­
cially' difficult period when the country was organizing 
its independent life, and that is perhaps the reason
15
why they ended on an unhappy note for Panama, just 
15 days after independence, with the signing of the 
Isthmian Canal Convention or Hay-Buneau Varilla Treaty 
of 18 November 1903, which granted the United States 
of America perpetual rights over 1,432 square kilome­
ters of Panamanian territory, "as if it were sovereign", 
to construct, operate and maintain the Panama Canal.
The construction of the Panama Canal was a 
landmark in national and world maritime history. Works 
began as early as 1904, first with a general sanitary 
operation that led to the medical breakthrough of Wil­
liam C. Gorgas' discovery of the cause of yellow fever. 
The construction itself was associated with the name 
of engineer George W. Goethals, whose work has been 
praised as the "Eighth Marvel of the World" and recently 
declared an International Historical Monument by the 
American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE).
The first ship ever to transit the Panama Canal 
was the SS Ancon, which made the inaugural trip on 15 
August 1914. Since that date, the Panama Canal has 
been the focal point of economic and maritime activity 
in the Republic of Panama, the most latent example of 
the country's maritime potential.
Given Panama's permanent discomfort with the 
1903 Panama Canal Treaty, the issue of regaining their 
rightful jurisdiction over the Canal area has been the 
daily bread of Panamanians. After protracted and diffi­
cult negotiations, whose last stage lasted ten years, 
the signing of two new treaties concerning the Panama
16
Canal signified a new chapter in the history of the 
waterway and of the host country, perhaps the single 
most important event influencing Panamanian maritime 
affairs in the future.
After the final round of negotiations, in 
which the peaceful vocation of the Panamanian people 
provided a lesson for other nations of the world as 
regards the peaceful resolution of conflicts, on 7 
September 1977 the Head of State of the Republic of 
Panama and the President of the United States of Ame­
rica signed, in Washington D.C., the final texts of 
the Panama Canal Treaty.Between the Republic of Panama 
and the United States of America and the Treaty Con­
cerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the 
Panama Canal Between the Republic of Panama and the 
United States of America, which constitute the new 
regime for this international waterway. The two 
treaties were subjected to the ratification procedures 
of both countries and the Instruments of Ratification 
exchanged between the two heads of goveirnment on 16 
June 1978, in the city of Panama. The Panama Canal 
Treaties of 1977 finally entered into force six months 
after the date when the Instruments of Ratification 
went into effect for treaty purposes, on 1 October 1979.
The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 have far- 
reaching national and international implications. For 
world traders, they represent a guarantee that the 
waterway - a vital transportation link - will be peace­
fully and efficiently managed and operated until the
17
year 2000 by the US Government agency called the Pana­
ma Canal Commission (PCC), which is set up by the 
treaty to replace the former Panama Canal Company and 
take over some of the functions of the former Canal 
Zone Government. After 2000, Panama will take over 
the whole canal operation.
The implications of these treaties domestic­
ally are obviously crucial. To use language treaty,
2. In accordance with the terms of this Treaty 
and related agreements, the Republic of Panama, 
as territorial sovereign, grants to the United 
States of America, for the duration of this Trea­
ty, the rights necessary to regulate the transit 
of ships through the Panama Canal, and to manage, 
operate, maintain, improve, protect and defend 
the Canal. The Republic of Panama guarantees to 
the United States of America the peaceful use of 
the land and water areas which it has been grant­
ed the right to use for such purposes pursuant
to this Treaty and related agreements.
3. The Republic of Panama shall participate inc­
reasingly in the management and protection and  ^
defense of the Canal, as provided in this Treaty.
This means that Panama undertakes certain obligations 
vis-a-vis the United States during the life of the 
treaty, while at the same time specifying that the 
country has to prepare itself for assuming full control 
of the waterway through "the growing participation of 
Panamanian nationals at all other levels and areas of 
employment in the aforesaid Commission, with the ob­
jective of preparing, in an orderly and efficient man-
8ner, for the assumption...." by Panama of the duties 
outlined herein.
From the above we can infer that Panama needs 
both to increase its participation in canal affairs
18
at all levels and to do so based on the improved 
training of its nationals. This all-important con­
cept of the training of Panamanians for handling 
the canal, as well as the implications of studying 
other transportation alternatives to the Panama 
Canal will be discussed in more detail in subse­
quent chapters of this dissertation.
The Open Registry Fleet
Aside from the construction of the Panama 
Canal in 19*14, obviously the other maritime develop­
ment of import during Panama's Republican Period is 
the creation of the open registry of ships in 1925.
Several longstanding features of Panamanian 
law served as the foundation for the country's mer­
chant marine, officially created with the promulga­
tion of Law No. 25 of 12 January 1925, which set the 
guidelines for ship registration. The Fiscal Code 
of the republic, in particular, contained provisions 
enabling Panamanian nationals to purchase vessels 
abroad; to obtain provisional registration of their 
ships from Panamanian consuls abroad; and to finalize 
registration procedures upon arrival to the country. 
"However, the purpose and use of this feature of the 
law in the early years of the republic were limited
9to Panamanian citizens and companies."
Although it is not our intention here to pro­
vide a detailed account of the evolution of the re­
gistry, we do feel it is interesting to note some 
remarks made by Rodney Carlisle, who has done extensive
19
research on the historical aspects of the origins and 
evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian flags, on 
the subject of the 1925 law on ship registration:
...the new law brought together the specific 
existing attractions of the Panamanian codes.
The system for registry through consuls abroad, 
previously covered by Article 589 of the Fiscal 
Code, became Article 18 of the new law. The 
1925 law made the procedures and steps for ship 
registry clearer and more concise, producing 
the neat, packaged code requested by shipowners.
Yet, several features of the law were writ­
ten to provide Panama, at least on paper, with 
new benefits. Article 16 revived an old Colom­
bian requirement regarding the nationality of 
crew, ans stated that at least ten per cent of 
any crew on a Panamanian-registered vessel be 
citizens of Panama, provided those applying for 
employment are up to the physical and moral stand­
ards required for the post. The proviso made it 
clear that the ten per cent was, what a later era 
would call an employment guideline; no recruit­
ment goals or special training were specified to 
bring employment up to a minimum quota... Article 
17 empowered the Panamanian President to establish 
»a maritime academy and to require that Panamanian- 
^registered vessels employ its gradutates. (Our 
emphasis).10
The same author later arrives at the conclu­
sion that, although there is a general tendency to 
believe that the Panamanian registry was created by 
American shipowners and policy-makers to solve the 
dilemmas of American shipping.
Evidence does not support such a conspiracy theo­
ry of the development of the Panamanian system for 
American purposes... The system did respond to the 
pressures of shipowners, and to their desires for
an unregulated business environment._But_Panama__
fought the American business and official view___
that Panama's sovereignty was a sham and its flag 
a symbol of sovereignty for sale(our emphasis).11
Setting aside for a moment the origins of the 
Panamanian open registry system, it is also worth noting 
that its evolution was also a product of Panamanian 
creative thinking put to the test and of the ability
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of our lawyers and leaders to understand the needs 
of foreign shipowners and to create a framework 
within which these investors could feel attracted 
to Panama. In our opinion, despite arguments to 
the contrary in a multiplicity of fora, the Pana­
manian ships' register is an autoctonous product 
born out of the creativity of a people that must 
deal with the fact that they largely lack product­
ive natural resources other than the country's geo­
graphical configuration and position. As such it 
can be argued that the problems affecting the re­
gistry are but a reflection of the fact that it is 
run from Panama and by Panamanians and is, because 
of this, subject to the vissicitudes of maritime 
development in any developing country.
In line with this argument, a prominent 
Panamanian lawyer and former negotiator of the 
1977 Panama Canal Treaties, Dr. Carlos Lopez- 
Guevara, has explained the often-ignored link bet­
ween Panama and its fleet in the following terms:
The main feature of our legislation is that it 
is based upon_the governmental policy of attract­
ing and protecting foreign investments and al­
ways endeavouring not to be placed out of the 
market by the competition. We are able to offer 
stability because of our democratic way of govern­
ment, our legislation and its interpretation. We 
are very well known for keeping our contractual 
obligations. Besides, w'e have the law on corpo­
rations that follows the American pattern. This 
law was enacted in 1932 and remains the same, as 
an excellent example of the firmness of our insti­
tutions. (Our emphasis)12
In accordance with our previous appreciations,
and of the fact that there are many aspects of Panama's
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maritime development in which there is room for imp­
rovement, we shall now turn briefly to a consideration 
of some of the problems facing the Panamanian open re­
gistry fleet in contemporary times. This we do as a 
necessary first-step in the formulation of our strategy 
for improvement later on.
Panama's open registry has always been the sub­
ject of criticisms on the part of seafarers, governments 
and international bodies. By nature controversial and 
considered to be a threat to the fleets of traditional 
maritime nations and to developing countries aiming at 
establishing their national shipping, the Panamanian 
fleet can boast an excellent record of willingness to 
listen and improve. Yet, in the face of the latest 
and most vehement of all attacks, the one being staged 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop­
ment (UNCTAD) in the form of an attempt to draft and 
implement a convention on the conditions for the regis­
tration of ships in any country, some comments must be 
made here.
July 1976 was the time when concerted efforts 
began, on a worldwide basis, to eliminate open regis­
tries. As some may remember, it was thdn that UNCTAD 
created an Ad-Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group to 
study and prepare a report on the effects of the exist­
ence or lack of existence of a "genuine link" between 
merchant vessels and their country of registration. This 
first step was taken by the UNCTAD Secretariat itself, 
with the support of developing countries, the Soviet
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Union and the Peoples' Republic of China. The report 
of the group was presented to UNCTAD V, held in Mani­
la, and, from then on, over,ten long years which we 
need not recount here, the arguments against the exist­
ence of open registries have swayed over a very broad 
spectrum. From claims that they impeded the growth 
of fleets in developing countries; to claims that the 
overall safety, health and pollution prevention mea­
sures that prevailed on board these vessels were ina­
dequate; to .a more recent claim that all UNCTAD wants 
is to estab.lish some kind of parameters for their opera­
tion, the result is that there is now a more positive 
appreciation of the trade and economic issues that are 
really at stake. In this regards, we feel that the 
change in attitude at UNCTAD can be categorized as a 
big step forward, and as a more mature way of looking 
at shipping within the context of the maritime develop­
ment of all nations, open registry countries included.
In July 1984 UNCTAD convened a diplomatic con­
ference to begin work on a draft document on the condi­
tions that should be required for the registration of 
ships, pursuant to the mandate given to this body by 
a UN General Assembly Resolution ( 37/209) dated 20 
December 1982. This was mandated in the context of 
UN General Assembly attempts to achieve the objectives 
of the International Development Strategy for the Third 
United Nations Development Decade.
After two subsequent meetings held in Geneva 
this year (January and July), there is now at hand an
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approved draft convention and everything seems to indi­
cate that some type of agreement will be reached in 
January 1986, when the next scheduled meeting takes 
place also in Geneva.
While the proposed text is but a very diluted ver­
sion of UNCTAD's original proposals for the phasing 
out of open registries in a period of ten years, the 
draft is nevertheless a setback for all maritime na­
tions in the sense that it will not achieve the main 
goal for which it was allegedly prepared, viz., to 
allow developing countries to build up their national 
fleets. The convention adds an emotional and political 
burden to the achievement of that goal and, on the 
other hand, says nothing about how a developing country 
can really go about building its maritime activities 
and administration. By attempting to regulate what is 
essentially a national competence and by not being able 
either to destroy the open registries as it propounded, 
all that is really achieved is the adoption .of a dan­
gerous precedent as regards crucial issues such as the 
treatment of foreign investments in a country or the 
use of the international machinery-for harmonizing ideas 
and not for pitting nations against nations.
CHAPTER TWO
A STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL MARITIME DEVELOPMENT
In the previous chapter we tried to trace the 
historical development of maritime-related activities 
in the Republic of Panama, as a way of justifying our 
initial contention that Panama is a maritime nation 
par excellence and also as a way of indicating the real 
growth potential which the author attaches to these 
activities. We now propose to introduce the global
concept of our strategy f^r acFTevihg" PanaTma'-’^xrprtriTfnTm 
maritime development over the next f if teen-yearsT~~~Th 
subsequent chapters we will particularize proposals 
for the most important maritime activities and how we 
feel our proposals could be 'put into practice.
The main natural resources of Panama are its 
geographical location and configuration. During our 
^ars as> a maritime administrator, we became convinced 
that, in order to make optimum use of these resources, 
and for them to generate the resources needed for sust­
aining our population and investing in the future, Pa­
nama needs to devise and implement a coherent develop­
ment st^^tegy__for_its maritime sector. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, "national maritime sectormeans 
the set of resources and activities that are carried 
out in Panama and which are directly related to the sea.
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including the human resources, the open registry fleet, 
the national ports, maritime ancillary industries, the 
Panama Canal and fishing activities. The national ma­
ritime sector thus defined into its principal compo­
nents is the subject of this study and of the develop­
ment strategy we are posposing herein for an optimum 
utilization of Panama's geographical position (See 
Figure 3).
Before we outline the strategy per se, we feel 
it is necessary to provide our readers with a brief 
but comprehensive overview of the current performance, 
in social and economic terms, of each of the main compo 
nents of the national maritime sector, as a way of high 
lighting their relative importance within the economy 
today and also of hinting at their potential for growth
Beginning with the open registry, we find that
it is the second largest merchant fleet in the world.
As of 30 June 1985, according to Panamanian Government
sources, it included 11,850 ships that totalled some 
1351,177,683 grt. The fleet currently produces around 
$50 million US dollars per year in direct tax revenues 
to the Panamanian State, plus almost double that amount 
by way of legal and other services.
In the field of employment of nationals, how­
ever, the figures indicate marginal growth. Three 
big shipowners with offices located in Panama City 
employ the most significant amount of Panamanian sea­
farers, but these are only seamen. These companies 
are Esso, Texaco and Panavigas, a subsidiary of Hapag
Lloyd.
tvjo>
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On a separate and interesting experimental 
basis, there are some 300 Panamanian officers and 
seamen currently employed on board Panamanian-flag 
vessels under tKe terms of a collective employment 
agreement that was negotiated directly between the 
Asociacion Panamena de Oficiales de Marina ( APOM- 
the Panamanian merchant marine officers' organiza­
tion) and the Union Nacional de Marinos de Panama 
(UNMP- one of the the two principal unions of Pana­
manian merchant seamen). The 300 men that were 
employed for differing periods of time between Sep­
tember 1983 and December 1984 earned a total of US
$300,000, a figure that indicates the potential that
14lies in the field.
Despite the fact that Panama had no direct 
control over the operations of its two principal 
deepwater ports until the entry into force of the 
1977 Panama Canal Treaties, Balboa and Cristobal 
have continued to operate without major problems 
in the period following their return to Panamanian 
jurisdiction. As seen in Table 1, by 1984 Balboa 
had dramatically increased its cargo handling fig­
ures, from 176,184 metric tons in the previous year 
to 402,144 metric tons at the end of 1984. The same 
applies to Cristobal, which increased the amount of 
cargo handled, from 138,495 metric tons in 1983 to 
416,020 metric tons at the end of 1984. These figures 
include the handling of national industrial exports
for a total value of US$71.6 million in 1984 also 15
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PANAMANIAN PORTS MOVEMENT 
Table 1. Balboa and Cristobal Ports Movement (1983-1984)
C R IS T O B A L
■
BALBOA
i e e 3 1984 1983 1 9 6 4
S H I P S 7 79 1754 70 f 1398
CARSO Cm .T.) /36495 418 020 176 m 402/44
l O A D E D 59245 22014 39700
OKJLOADED tZ06(>B 35877i 7X4770 382444
CONTAINERS 17205 4.8938 744S70 3/224
LOADED 6577 23309 7344 78773
UMLOADED ---------- —^ 6628 23627
7067 7S777
Source; Panamanian Ship, June 1984 and 
February 1985.
Table 2. Balboa and Cristobal Port Movement (Jan-March 1985
CRVSTOBAL B A L B O A
JAM FE6 MU 3AN FEB MAP
S H IP S 146 120 405 96 lOI 927
CARGO (M T .) 35871 £9490 (023(0 26447 24434 82441
LOADED 3604 133B5 (765 3890 (0194
UNLOADED 3(040 25706 88034 24612 2S537 72215
CONTAl NERS 4060 5218 1(227 (700 2019 5876
LOADED 2009 1639 5426. 907 (0(8 2992
, UNLOADED 20SB 1579 6801 602 lOOl 2684
Source; Panamanian Ship, March-May 1985.
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An indication of early 1985 performance is found in 
Table 2.
It has been further estimated that, if the 
Panamanian Government finally decides to go ahead 
with its plans for the Panama Centreport Project, 
the country could receive ah additional US$150 million 
per year in revenues and some 15,000 new jobs would 
be created.
With respect to marine ancillary industries 
there are almost no economic performance indicators 
available. These include a minimum of ten different 
marine support activities, viz., cargo-handling, pipeline, 
lighterage, transportation, warehousing, shiprepairs, 
ship stores and supplies, bunkering, shipping opera­
tions, ship agency and freight forwarding, banking 
and commercial services, tourism, telecommunications 
and the Free Zone of Colon. It is worth singling out, 
however, two of these industries for which more data 
is available.
Since October 1982, the trans-isthmian oil 
pipeline operated by Petroterminal de Panama, S.A. 
has become an important revenue earner for Panama.
This pipeline is devoted to the transport of Alaskan 
crude oil from the port of Charco Azul, in the Paci­
fic coast of the province of Chiriqui, to the port 
of Chriqui Grande, in the Atlantic coast of the pro­
vince of-Bbcas del Toro. At present, the company 
employs 450 Panamanians on a permanent basis and pays 
an average of US$ 9 million in wages. An additional
at least at the provin-contribution to the economy,
cial level, is the fact 500 jobs have been created
in the two provinces, while it is estimated that the
company made purchases of about US$20 million in the
local commerce and paid electricity bills of almost
US$8.5 million. As a holder of 40% of the company's
shares, Panama's Government recently received a check
for US$28 million in dividends, aside from the US$28.4
17million that it received in the way of taxes.
The other ancillary industry for which some 
figures are available is that of shiprepairs. The 
main shiprepairers in Panama, Astilleros Balboa S.A. 
(ASBA)is a private Franco-Panamanian company that be­
gan operations in 1982 and has grown at a slow but 
steady rate since then. Company sources estimate that
they have served an average of 100 vessels per year.
18In 1984, ASBA employed between 225 and 350 workers.
Fishing is the country's second export reve­
nue earner, after bananas. According to industry 
reports, in 1984 Panama exported 10,980 MT of fish, 
worth US$55.6 million. The industry represents an 
investment of around US$150 million, of which US$80 
million belong to private companies and the rest to
the State. Around 5,000 workers are employed in fish-
19ing, and almost 25,000 Panamanians depend on it.
Obviously, the principal maritime activity in 
Panama is the Panama Canal. In terms of revenues, it 
is estimated that it makes an annual contribution of 
some US$600 million to the national economy. Around
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6,000 Panamanians are employed by the PCC, while it 
is often argued that it is likewise the indirect 
source of many other benefits and revenues, especially 
those connected with services rendered to transiting 
vessels.
It is expected that the indicators we have 
provided herein underscore the fact that there is al­
ready in existence in Panama a comprehensive set of 
sea-related activities that contribute significantly 
to the economy and the grounds for whose growth itV
is our goal to prepare through the implementation of 
our Strategy.
The Strategy; Premises and Assumptions
The first aspect that we must bear in mind 
is that this Strategy is based on the contents of 
UNCLOS III and that it strives to illustrate how Pa­
nama can make use of its concepts for fostering na­
tional maritime development until 2000. In order to 
do this, of course, resort must be made to the na­
tional development strategy in order to identify the 
guidelines, resources and tools available for doing so.
Such a premise is not only desirable but ne­
cessary, for our Strategy. As a nation fully commit­
ted to the ideals of the United Nations organization 
and basically identified with the needs and aspira­
tions of developing countries like itself, Panama 
cannot and should not attempt to develop the resources 
of its geography and ocean waters without giving due 
regard to UNCLOS III, even if it is not yet in force.
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Notwithstanding the fact that they have not been 
officially linked, it is necessary to indicate here 
that, as far as developing countries are concerned, 
UNCLOS III is the only building block available for 
instituting the New International Economic Order we 
are longing for.
It is not essential to discuss in this paper 
the scope of UNCLOS III nor to enumerate the topics 
it deals with. Suffice it to say that, wherever it 
could be relevant, UNCLOS III contains a provision 
that could be applied to one or the other maritime 
activity present in the Republic of Panama. Moreover, 
in our opinion, the instrument provides rather good 
and comprehensive guidelines for developing not only 
shipping, but the rest of the maritime activities 
that we wish to foster in Panama. The following parts 
of the convention are particularly relevant to Panama­
nian maritime activities: Part II, on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone; Part V, on the Exclusive Econ­
omic Zone; Part VI, on the Continental Shelf; Part VII, 
on the High Seas; Part XII, on Protection and Preser­
vation of the Marine Environment; and Part XIV, on the 
Development and Transfer of Marine Technology.
Despite the fears that this premise may raise
r
in some of my compatriots, who may be concerned with 
the effect of the clauses relating to nationality of 
ships and genuine link (Article 91)';. and with the du­
ties of the Flag State (Article 94), after a thorough 
and careful evaluation of these provisions, and of
33
consultations with experts in the Law of the Sea, we 
are able to state that there is no contradiction bet­
ween the convention and Panama's current handling of 
its maritime affairs. Panama's shipping director him­
self, Dr. Hugo Torrijos, has stated that UNCLOS III 
"does not, as some would argue, contradict the open 
registry system being practiced by Panama, but instead
favours it. We have taken the steps to exercise full
20control and jurisdiction over vessels." Thus, per­
haps only pending the final outcome of the UNCTAD 
Conference on Ship Registration ( next meeting sche­
duled for January 1986 !) in order to see if that body 
produces a more clear-cut definition of the "genuine 
link", the Republic of Panama should entertain the 
possibility of ratifying UNCLOS III after a close eva­
luation of its merits and without ignoring political 
expediency.
jurisdiction aside, it is important to note that the 
UNCLOS III Convention is the umbrella for all of the 
activities of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) in the fields of training of marine personnel, 
maritime safety and prevention and control of marine 
pollution from vessels. By using the language and 
spirit of the convention first, and then’ going ahead 
with a full implementation of IMO international stan­
dards through a .qualitative improvement of the coun­
try's maritime sdfety administration and maritime
Questions of nationality of ships and flag
training schemes, Panama can fulfill its duties under
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the international conventions and also make a signi 
ficant contribution to make the seas safer and the 
oceans cleaner.
current institutional framework of Panama's maritime 
activities and industries are gene-rally adequate for 
implementing the actions we recommend and that only 
minor organizational changes are necessary at this 
stage and until the target year 2000. By institutional 
framework here we mean both the private and the govern­
ment agencies and companies that currently develop 
some type of maritime activity in Panama. Included 
in the governmental group are: the national maritime 
administration, called Direccion General Consular y 
de Naves of the Panamanian Ministry of Finance and 
Treasury (SECNAVES); the national ports administration, 
called Autoridad Portuaria Nacional (APN), an autono­
mous agency of the national government under the di­
rection of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the 
national fishing administration, called Direccion Ge­
neral de Recursos Marinos (DGRM), a department of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the nautical school, 
called Escuela Nautica de Panama (ENP), which depends 
on the Ministry of Education; and a separate agency 
of the US Government, the PCC, which is nevertheless 
run by a Board of Directors composed of four Panamanians 
and five US citizens until the year 19^, when this pro- 
tion will be directly inverted to give preference to
A second premise of the Strategy is that the
nationals of the Republic of Panama.
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The first three agencies we have described 
above would need to make some organizational changes 
in order to implement the strategic goals we will 
outline for them shortly. These changes, however, 
are basically geared towards a strengthening of their 
technical, operational and policy-making departments. 
This is a simple but essential step, as the current 
staff composition of these three institutions is now­
adays too heavily burdened with professionals who 
have no formal training oE relevant experience in 
basic areas such as: marine engineering, naval archi­
tecture and nautical subjects; general maritime admin­
istration and maritime safety administration; maritime 
transport; shipping; and oceanology. The fourth ins­
titution on the list, the ENP, is the only exception 
to the general rule we have stated here, meaning that 
its staff is largely composed of marine officers who, 
although young and inexperienced,, are now training to 
become professional maritime educators. The last ins­
titution on our list, the PCC, is running most effi­
ciently and no changes in its setup are desirable for 
the time being, except perhaps -as may be envisaged in 
the agreements for the execution of the canal treaties.
Also as a part of our second premise, we must 
say a word about the need for increased collaboration 
and integrative mechanisms within government. Because 
all maritime activities are interrelated, in order to 
optimize resource allocation and exploitation, all 
government agencies and institutions of the Panamanian
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national maritime sector must work together to pro-
21duce coherent, comprehensive policies. This colla­
boration will probably, in the course of time, re­
sult in an increased awareness of the need to create 
new agencies for greater shipping and ocean develop 
ment. In this connection, we would recommend the 
creation of national ad hoc committee of maritime 
experts, wholly composed of Panamanian citizens, who 
would be directly responsible to the President of 
the Republic and whose task it would be to assist 
the Executive in the formulation of maritime poli­
cies, including a formal statement of Panama's ma­
ritime policy, the necessary first-step for national 
maritime development in any country.
To aid the government policy-makers in the
structuring of such a committee, we would recommend 
consideration of the experience of nations such as 
Portugal, with its Ministry of the Sea; Prance, with 
its State Seeretariat~'fh-^charge of the Sea and a 
junior minister in -charge of the merchant marine;
Sri Lanka's National Aquatic Resources Agency (KARA); 
and India's Department of Ocean Development (DOD), 
under the Prime Minister himself. A step in this 
last direction would undoubtedly place Panama in a 
much better and "competitive position for optimizing 
the benefits derived from its natural resources.
The third and final assumption we make con­
cerns the future demand for Panamanian transport and
related services, as well as for the resources of
its oceans. We have assumed that, given Panama's 
maritime background and the timely adoption of the 
recommendations we include in our Strategy, the 
country will continue to enjoy a privileged posi­
tion in world trade, well into the next century.
Demand for fish and other living resources of the 
Panamanian territorial and economic waters will 
probably increase and, given current exploitation 
practices, supplies will be plentiful during the 
period. In essence, all other things remaining 
equal, the attainment of ourstrategic goals will 
allow Panama to increase its maritime activity 
levels to new heights, earn additional revenues 
for sustaining the population and improving their 
standard of living, and for allowing the country 
to invest in other export-oriented activities in 
the not too distant future.
The Strategy; Development Goals
This dissertation has been entitled Panama
_A Strategy for National Maritime Development
because it presents at its core a general, long- 
range scheme for guiding the development of Panama's 
maritime activities over the next fifteen years. These 
are our recommendations for improving the economic 
and social performance indicators of the sector, with 
the ultimate aim of contributing to the welfare of all 
Panamanians. It is not a "plan", that is, a detailed 
program of action priorities. Neither can it be cons-
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idered a "program", or timing for the execution of 
a plan through Concrete projects. It is rather a 
compilation of the basic information needed for 
making many government and private company plans, 
programs, projects or schemes aimed at helping Pa­
nama achieve full maritime development by the year 
2000. The purpose of the Strategy, as outlined 
earlier, is to orient the Panamanians about the 
possibilities for improving the quality and the 
amount of the benefits they derive from the sea, 
as a way of making the country more economically 
and politically independent.
The Strategy itself should best be defined 
as a set of development goals to be achieved by 
each of the components of the national maritime 
sector within the period 1986-2000. These goals, 
and how to translate them into reality, are explain­
ed in more detail in subsequent chapters dealing 
specifically with each maritime activity being car­
ried out in Panama, but we must at this stage identi­
fy them as follows:
GOAL 1 - Development of Human Resources in the 
Maritime Field; Within the time limit 
of fifteen years, it is our goal to 
train enough deck and engine officers, 
ratings, naval architects, general mar­
itime and maritime safety administrators, 
shipping company managers, and maritime 
educators to satisfy the personnel needs
39
GOAL 2
GOAL 3
of the national maritime sector and to 
provide added employment opportunities 
for Panama's fast-growing population.
- Fostering the employment of Panamanian 
seafarers on board national flag ves-sels: 
This goal is aimed at providing Panama­
nian seafarers with the necessary sea­
time and shipboard experience required 
by IMO's Convention on Standards of Train­
ing, Certification and Watchkeeping,1978 
(better known as the STCW Convention,1978). 
It is a goal intimately connected to the 
strengthening of the links between the 
country and its fleet, the reduction of 
conflicts with port states and interna­
tional seafarers's unions, and to the 
training of Panamanian pilots for the 
Panama Canal.
- Strengthening of the National Maritime 
Safety Administration; Under this goal 
we envisage the adoption and full imple­
mentation of all major IMO conventions 
relating to safety and pollution prev­
ention and control, with an aim of imp­
roving the fleet's safety record, reduc­
ing casualties that result in loss of 
life or extensive damage to the marine 
environment, and of generally increasing 
the efficiency of the open registry fleet.
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GOAL 4
GOAL 5
GOAL 6
- Development of Panama's two maj^n_dee£-
water ports into a major container__
transshipment center called "Panama_
Centreport^; This goal envisions the 
establishment of .another non-marine 
transportation to the Panama Canal in 
the isthmus, to serve world trade needs 
arising from the container revolution 
and its more receni development, the 
round-the-world services of US Lines 
and Evergreen, among others.
- Catering to the needs of domestic trade
and transport needs via the improvement 
of strategic regional ports infrastruct­
ures : With this goal we endeavour to
encourage the progress of Panama's hint­
erland and the regional integration of 
the country by ensuring that key popula­
tion and production centers are suitably 
served by the national ports network.
- Fostering the growth and strengthening
i — — ____
better serve the Panama Canal and the 
national ports, especially shiprepairs 
and tourism; Within the ambit of this 
goal we include the adoption of all 
viable measures for making available 
in Panama the cheap and efficient sup­
port services required by maritime trans-
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GOAL 7
GOAL 8
port. Special consideration must be 
given, with this goal, to those act­
ivities that have a greater and faster 
growth potential, such as shiprepairs 
and tourism offerings for passengers 
on board cruise vessels and for crews 
making stopovers in Panama.
- Evaluating the transportation alterna­
tives to the Panama Canal, giving due 
consideration to "^he Panamanian Alt­
ernative" that favours a new locks ca­
nal built around the existing route;
This goal represents the need to carry 
out serious feasibility studies of all 
major transportation alternatives to 
the Panama Canal, as mandated by the 
1977 Panama C^nal Treaties, with the 
objective of deciding what is the best 
alternative for Panama.
- Promoting the fishing industry through
a modernization of existing legislation, 
the granting of incentives for the dev­
elopment of a modern and efficient fish-
/ inq fleet that can exploit the resources 
of the Exclusive Economic Zone, and the 
diversification of exports and of national 
fish consumption patterns: Under this
goal we encompass all the possible ways 
of optimizing the benefits that Panama
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derives from its fishing activities, 
both for consumption and for export.
The eight goals we have previously outlined 
constitute the targets for which individual components 
of the national maritime sector must aim. Their eva­
luation first, and implementation later, we believe, 
will result in great benefit to Panama and its people 
in the short and medium run through the reduction of 
conflicts with other states, the improved image of 
Panama in the international arena, the generation of 
new jobs and sources of revenue, and the consolida­
tion of a truly healthy climate for maritime activi­
ties in the country.
CHAPTER THREE
HUMAN RESOURCES
Human resources are the most abundant of all 
resources available to nations, although the harnes­
sing of their potential is always costly and time- 
consuming. The goal of training and of increasing 
the expertise of human resources in different facets 
of human activity is thus always a major considera­
tion when working to effect change.
When we started to work on this dissertation,
\
it suddenly became very obvious that our first and 
foremost problem in implementing any strategy, no 
matter how simple or complex, would be the lack of 
Panamanians specifically trained in maritime affairs. 
Although the population of the country generally en­
joys a high level of education in traditional fields 
of knowledge, in areas such a shipping and maritime 
affairs there is a very big vacuum. We then came up 
with the idea of making the training of human resour­
ces for the Panamanian maritime sector our number one 
and overriding goal, the goal that, if and when it 
is achieved, will allow us to ride the waves triumph­
antly towards Panama's full maritime development.
Although maritime activities in Panama seem 
healthy for the time being, in today's highly complex 
shipping scenario there is no longer any room left
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for improvising, and the time will soon come when 
expertise in maritime affairs will be essential 
for the continued success of the national maritime 
sector. Up to now, as we have indicated at times 
in the course of this essay, developments in Panama 
seem haphazard, and no good explanation can be of­
fered to our readers as to why things have prosper­
ed in the midst of apparent disarray and lack of 
design.
The preparation of this Strategy for nation­
al maritime is partly aimed at correcting this sit­
uation. Such great attention is being given at the 
international level to maritime training, both at 
IMO and at the International Labour Organization(ILO), 
as well as in the context of the provisions of UNCLOS 
III, that Panama cannot escape for much long,er the 
strength of the tide. Something must be done short­
ly about the training of maritime personnel and the 
ideas we will outline here are simply guidelines for 
trying to correct what we believe are the two main 
human resources problems prevailing in Panama, viz., 
the lack of specialized maritime personnel in several 
specific categories, and the inability of Panamanian 
seafarers, especially officers, to get the necessary 
experience for becoming full officers and for enjoy­
ing the possibilities of a good remuneration, more 
expertise and a better standard of living that are 
elsewhere associated with the profession.
In the current setup we find that the only
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opportunity for maritime training is offered by the 
ENP. This training is aimed at deck and engineer 
officers basically, although there is also a one- 
year program for ratings. Tentative plans for creat­
ing a school for polivalent ratings in the province 
of Colon were abandoned some time ago due to govern­
mental apathy and the fact that the project itself 
had not been adequately structured. Similarly, more 
interesting plans for the creation of special mari­
time training high schools in certain areas of the 
country with known interest in the seas and fishing 
were also abandoned some years ago, due mainly to 
political considerations.
Given the fact that training is only availa­
ble for officers and, to a lesser degree, for ratings, 
we must now discuss the ways in which this training 
can be improved. This must be done, of course, start­
ing from the fact that Panama is not a traditional 
maritime nation and that the employment of nationals 
has never been really fostered.
The issue of training Panamanian seafarers 
must be viewed at two different levels: the national 
and the international level. At the national level 
we face the question of how to make this training 
fit within the overall scheme of the open registry, 
a much debated and politically salient issue. And, 
on the other hand, we have the question of why invest 
in this type of education if there are no guaranteed 
returns, no possibilities for employment, and also the
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question of how to train pilots and other floating 
equipment personnel for the Panama Canal without 
sending them to sea/ as is usual in more advanced 
maritime nations.
At the second level of analysis we find the 
problems associated with Panama's image within the 
developing world community, the country's many bilat­
eral and multilateral commitments, and the heteroge­
neity of the pool of seafarers that mans Panama's 
open registry fleet and who must be protected while 
sailing under the national flag.
Arriving at a compromise between these two 
levels of analysis is very difficult indeed, but we 
feel that Panama should make a real effort in this 
regards. Despite the economic disruptions that many 
advocates of the status quo dream about, the fact is 
that there will be no more maritime development in 
Panama or increases in revenues unless Panamanians 
are adequately trained for handling maritime affairs, 
private companies and government agencies included. 
Reasons brandished for not moving in this direction 
are becoming increasingly unacceptable and will event­
ually result in a deterioration of current performance 
levels and an impoverishment of the population, exact­
ly the opposite of what everybody hopes for.
So far, efforts to train seafarers, as we have 
explained, have generally fared better than efforts 
to find them jobs. This situation prevails in spite
of the fact that under Article 226 of Panama's Labour
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Code, the legislation regulating the employment of 
seafarers on board Panamanian-flag vessels, provides 
for a ten per cent of all seamen on board each na­
tional vessel to be composed of Panamanian nationals, 
or of foreigners married to Panamanians or having 
Panamanian children, provided they reside in Panama.
This unwillingness of the Panamanian govern­
ments of all times to permit Panamanians to work on 
board ships seems to contradict other efforts aimed 
at improving the quality of the education offered by 
the ENP. According to the school's Director, Capt. 
Antonio Motta,
....the school's new curriculum has proved that 
it fulfills its commitments, since reports re­
ceived from masters and shipping companies about 
our cadets are satisfactory. Success is due to 
efforts undertaken by the school's officials,the 
■Work and dedication of the professors, and the 
development of the PAN/81/005 Technical Assist­
ance Project being executed by IMO and financed 
by the Panamanian Government and the United Na­
tions Development Program (UNDP).22
However, these efforts, humble and inadequate 
as they may seem to some, must be appreciated within 
the framework of the situation that we have outlined 
here. This seems to be but yet another reflection 
of the fact that the right hand does not know what 
the left hand is doing, or that it is at least con­
veniently ignoring it. Anyhow, the net result is 
that despite extremely adverse conditions, some prog­
ress is being in the field of maritime training in 
Panama.
As we have noted earlier in this chapter, 
little progress has been done in the way of allowing
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or, at least, helping Panamanians to find jobs on 
board national flag vessels. The only notable ex­
ception to this are the courageous efforts of the 
APOM and the UNMP to find jobs for their members 
through the arrangement of private collective emp­
loyment agreements, an effort that must somehow be 
understood by the decision-makers and complemented 
with more solid action.
The main reasons behind our concern for the 
training of Panamanian seafarers, and especially 
of officers, is the fact that Panama cannot hope 
to move forward in maritime affairs unless it can 
count on people that have had some kind of sea ex­
perience. Knowledge of what a ship is and what it 
needs, as well as of the general aspects of ships 
operations are essential for ensuring a quick turn- 
round in ports, delivering good and quick services, 
and generally attracting maritime and shipping clients. 
The problems that Panama faces today with its ports, 
the open registry fleet and other related activities,
I dare say, are born essentially out of the lack of 
adequate training of the personnel in charge of those 
activities. Yet the real problem will be faced as 
the time approaches for taking over the operations of 
the Panama Canal, a highly sophisticated operation 
that requires not only good business administrators 
and lawyers^ but also plenty of technical personnel, 
not the least of which are the pilots that compose 
the pilot force that is the heart of the entire canal
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organization and functioning.
Within Panama's overall training problems, 
the problem of the training of Panamanian pilots 
deserves special consideration here. The reason 
is that, despite impeccable efforts on the part of 
the Panama Canal Commission to train as many Pana­
manians as possible within the limits of their bud­
get and space availability on board PCC floating 
equipment and units, this is the area where Panama­
nian participation in the canal's labour force is 
weakest.
The Panama Canal is unique in the sense that, 
quite unlike Suez and Kiel, where pilots are just 
advisors to the ship's master, while in Panama Canal 
waters the ship is under the full control and command 
of the Panama Canal pilot. This is possible, in the 
opinion of maritime training experts and shipping 
people, only because of the highly qualified pilot 
force that we find there, an aspect that Panama must 
not overlook as it makes plans for taking over the 
waterway at the turn of the century.
Capt. Jeremlas De Leon, Panama's first pilot,
refers to the problem of pilot training in a rather
worried tone, stating that "only 29 (12.2%) of us
(Panamanians) have achieved this goal. At this pace,
less than three per year, it will take us 86 YEARS
23to replace the remaining 208 US citizens." in gen- 
ecal terms, Capt. De Leon's concerns are shared by 
IMO's maritime training expert, Capt. Max Tiedemann,
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who visited Panama during March-April 1979 on a 
special mission to evaluate pilot training in the 
Panama Canal. Capt. Tiedemann arrived at the fol­
lowing recommendations, which we quote here because 
of the fact that their author is a highly qualified 
senior pilot at the Kiel Canal and a man of great 
experience and learning;
2. Panama should be advised that, in order to 
meet the STCW Conference regulation II/2, the 
current practice of requiring a Master Mariner's 
Certificate/License as a condition of entry into 
the Pilotage Service should be continued. This 
is especially necessary in the case of the Panama 
Canal, in order to inspire the confidence of the 
Master from whom the pilot takes over command and, 
at the same time, to retain credibility within 
the international shipping community.24
With the above quote we end our discussion 
of the training of pilots for the Panama Canal and 
of the need for Panamanian seamen, especially the 
officers, to be allowed to gain the necessary expe­
rience on board Panamanian-flag vessels. Needless 
to say, we feel this an area that should be assigned 
the utmost priority in the immediate future, or else 
Panama risks the possibility of being unable to com­
ply with treaty provisions.
With respect to the training of other types 
of personnel that we have described under Goals 1 
and 2, we feel that the best alternative is to make 
extensive use of the training available at the World 
Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden. This institu­
tion was created under the auspices of IMO precisely 
to help developing countries overcome the lack of 
qualified maritime personnel. Instruction and on-the-job
A
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training are available as part of the curriculum at 
the WMU, and we feel there is really no better ins­
titution in its field.
Should financial considerations, however, 
limit the possibility of a large number of Panama­
nians being able to obtain their traning in general 
maritime administration, maritime safety administra­
tion, management of shipping companies, and maritime 
education and training at the WMU, then we would ad­
vise taking as many opportunities as are available 
for training Panamanians in other institutions abroad, 
through the widespread utilization of scholarships 
and other similar funding arrangements. Although 
the training may not be in ekactly the fields we have 
specified, training in any similar or related field 
of maritime activity, and living in a country that 
generally enjoys a healthy climate for shipping and 
maritime investments will undoubtedly contribute to 
the achievement of the overall goal.
Finally, when we considered training in the 
areas of port management and operations, and of fishing 
we arrived at the conclusion that, aside from efforts 
to improve the qualifications of local fishermen via 
the establishment of special courses, training in these 
areas could be best arranged under the auspices of 
the international organizations dealing with the sub­
jects, viz., UNCTAD, ILO and the International Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). Additional possibili­
ties for training could come from bilateral agreements 
with countries like The Netherlands, Egypt and Portugal
CHAPTER FOUR
THE OPEN REGISTRY FLEET
The open registry is perhaps the feature, 
besides the Panama Canal, that best identifies Pa­
nama as a Maritime Nation. Created almost with the 
republic at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
registry has evolved over a long period of time to 
become nowadays one of the country's principal ma­
ritime activities and a source of significant reve­
nues for country nationals, except seafarers.
In our chapter dealing with human resources 
we outlined the role that this Strategy feels should 
be played by the fleet in support of an integral dev­
elopment of Panamanian national maritime activities. 
This role encompasses both a revenue-producing and 
and training component. The training component of 
the role has been dealt with in that same chapter 
and requires no further elaboration. On the subject 
of revenue-earning, we feel that a general comment 
is necessary perhaps now.
Considering the current recession in the 
world shipping markets, at this stage we cannot fore­
see any significant growth, in real terms, for the 
Panamanian fleet. Marginal growth will continue to 
be registered, but this represents basically a change
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in flags and only a small increase via newbuilding 
registrations. This means that, for the time being, 
probably the most optimistic we can be as regards 
the fleet is to hope for a maintenance of current 
growth levels.
In this stage, which is basically an inte­
rim stage in which no majnfchanges will take place 
in the structure of the world fleet, we feel it 
would be wise for Panama to take the time to work 
on some aspects of its maritime safety administra­
tion that could benefit from changes in organiza­
tion and from the introduction of more qualified 
personnel into decision-making and technical areas. 
Thus, in our opinion, the time is right for "putting 
the house in order" while awaiting for an improve­
ment in the market situation.
Beginning with a consideration of its legal 
framework, which we have not discussed at any length 
thus far, we propose now to analyze the possibili­
ties for improving the open registry fleet and for 
preparing the grounds for .reaping greater benefits 
when the shipping activities pick up. In this res­
pect, we shall first take a look at the different 
sets of laws that permit the operation of the fleet.
Registration Laws
As described in Chapter One, Law No.8 of 1925 
is the basic law of the Panamanian ships register, 
since it establishes the conditions for the registra­
tion of vessels. This law was in turn complemented
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by Law No.54 of 1926, which spells out the proce­
dures for the cancellation of ship's registration 
in Panama.
Today it is possible to register virtually 
any type of vessel in Panama, except pleasure boats 
under 20 meters in length or below 50 grt. Vessels 
registered in Panama can be of any age, provided 
they are able to obtain the necessary documents for 
international trading. Panamanian law does not impose 
major restrictions on vessel registration; barges, 
floating docks, pontoons, drilling rigs, dredges and 
any other floating structure which requires a nations- 
ality can be registered in Panama.
As regards ownership, it is a well-known fact 
that any national or foreigner may own and register 
a ship under the Panamanian flag. A vessel may be
wholly owned by foreigners, but the law provides that
these owners be locally represented at all times, at
least through a Panamanian attorney or law firm.
Aside from the two basic registration laws that 
we mentioned at the outset, mention must be also made 
of Law No.2 of 1980, since it introduced several 
changes in the original ship registration regime. To 
begin with, it organized the Directorate General of 
Consular and Maritime Affairs as a directorate within 
the Panamanian Ministry of Finance and Treasury and 
gave it essentially all the powers relating to a na­
tional maritime administration, especially those re­
garding the implementation of international safety 
and pollution prevention and control measures, as
55
well as other more traditional functions such as 
those of licensing of marine personnel, surveys 
and inspections, and policy-making for the open 
registry fleet. This law reorganized the system 
for the issue of statutory and provisional certi­
ficates of registry for Panamanian vessels, to 
correct some of the problems that had been docu­
mented under the previous arrangement, where these 
documents were issued on a permanent basis. The 
law further provided for the de facto cancella­
tion of ships from the Panamanian registry; it 
strengthened the functions of SECNAVES as the 
national maritime administration; and also pro­
vided for sanctions in the case of non-compliance 
with international maritime conventions ratified 
by Panama. Finally, this law restricted the reg­
istration of yatchs in Panama, largely to avoid 
the administrative complications that had been long 
associated with their registration under the na­
tional flag.
With the introduction of this last law 
on registration of ships, we feel that Panama is 
more than adequately prepared to undertake its 
full responsabilities under international instru­
ments and that, for the time being, no changes 
should be contemplated in the registration regime.
Corporation Law
B.N. Metaxas has made the point that "in
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addition to straightforward cost considerations and 
pecuniary economies/ other criteria are applied by 
entreprenuers in deciding on the flag under which 
the vessel will be registered.. .The device of flags 
of convenience presupposes the existence of a.certain 
business organization form."^^ In this connection, 
it has often been stated that Panama's corporation 
1av^is one of the cornerstones of the open registry 
and of other international activities operated in 
the country, such as the banking, insurance and re- 
infinrance centers. The Panamanian law of corpora­
tions which regulates the organization and manage­
ment of corporations, and the registration of fo­
reign corporations' branches in Panama, "has five 
major characteristics: a) simplicity in the organi­
zation and management; b) quickness in organizing it; 
ci * low organization and maintenance costs; d) the 
absence of governmental controls, except in the case 
of value offered to the public; and e) legal stabi­
lity. "26
According to Panama's prominent maritime law­
yer, Dr. Lopez-Guevara, the creators of Law No. 32 
"did not envisage the great success that it would 
have. But the success is evident in the fact that, 
up until December 1983, some 350,000 corporations
o 7were registered in Panama."
As in the case of the registration regime, 
because of the fact that Panama's corporation law 
embodies the element of stability and predictability
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that generally attracts foreign shipowners.and inves­
tors, no changes to this law are recommended.
Commercial Laws
The Panamanian Code of Commerce of 1917 is 
the other key piece of legislation affecting ship 
registration in Panama, since it generally regulates 
titles to vessels and mortgages thereon. Under its 
Book II, as modified by Law No.14 of 27 May 1980, 
we find the legal provisions relating to vessels, 
shipowners, ship operators, maritime credits and 
their respective privileges, ship mortgages, attach­
ment and sale of vessels, and prescription.
In Panama, ship registration is carried out, 
on the basis of the registration and commercial laws 
we have outlined, through two governmental departments, 
namely, SECNAVES and the Public Registry, a semi-
autonomous agency of the Ministry of Government and
5 ' . 28Justice. After the initial request for registration
is made by a Panamanian lawyer to SECNAVES or to any 
Q of the special Panamanian consulates abroad empowered
to register vessels, it follows that the owner's ti­
tle to the ship and any mortgages on it must be rec­
orded at the Public Registry, in order to protect the 
respective rights. The ship is provisionally entered 
in the Panamanian registry and titles and mortages 
are preliminarily entered also at the Public Registry.
Legal title to a vessel will be established 
when its document (Bill of Sale or other supporting
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evidence) of title is recorded at the Public Regis­
try office in Panama. But such registration need 
not be effected in Panama right at the start. By 
means of Law No.14 of 1980, a special’system for 
the registration of titles and mortgages was created. 
According to one of its "fathers". Dr. Jose Angel 
Noriega,
This law created a more practical system than 
Law No.40 of 1956, since instead of requiring 
their handwritten registration in large and 
bulky volumes at the Panamanian consulates 
abroad, it provided for a new system in which 
the interested party just fills out a form 
before the Consul, detailing the major items 
contained in the mortgage. The Consul then 
transmits these details via telex to the Pana­
manian public registry, where the information 
is microfilmed and the provisional registra­
tion is thus executed. The interested party 
then has a six-month period in whSL'Ch to file 
the documents necessary for the final regis­
tration of the ship's mortgage. This system 
is also applicable in the registration of 
deeds. Law No.14 of 1980 allows the mortgagee 
to obtain a quick mortgage guarantee and to 
ensure the money needed for purchasing the 
vessel. This, in turn, makes it easier for. 9 qthe vessel to enter the Panamanian registry. ■*=’
Finally, we note briefly the main aspects 
of the most recent changes to Panama's commercial 
legislation. Law No.43 of 8 November 1984. This 
law is also about mortgages and was prepared by 
the Maritime Law Association of Panama in order 
to address some problems that had arisen with res- 
pect to substantive provisions of the Commercial 
Code. The basic innovations included in this law 
deal with: interest rates, marginal notes, the need 
to fix the value of the vessel in case of auction, 
aspects regarding revolving credits, formalities of
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the mortgage, multi-currency, presumption regarding 
sums owed, private sale, publicity of the private 
sale, how to fix the manner of payment and the int­
erest rate, preliminary registrations made in Panama, 
preliminary registrations made at night, preliminary 
registration of discharges or amendments to mortgages, 
possession and administration of the vessel in case 
of default, formalities of the sale of a vessel, and 
clarification regarding the preliminary registration
f ees. 30
Fiscal Laws
Under this heading we shall mention that 
Titles II and IV of the Fiscal Code of the Republic 
of Panama establish the basic fees for the registra­
tion of ships and the annual and other taxes that 
these must pay to the National Treasury. Greater 
clarification as regards the tax regime applicable 
to Panamanian vessels was obtained wi>th the prom­
ulgation of Law No.4 of 24 February 1983, in which 
we find a detail of all fees and payments to be made
by each vessel registered in the Panamanian fleet,
3 1according to its tonnage and characteristics.
Although not of a fiscal nature, but because 
they are promulgated under the authority vested in 
the Ministry of Finance and Treasury to act as a 
national maritime administration, in Annex I we in­
clude a list of other legal provisions affecting 
ship registration in Panama.
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Development Goals
Consonant with what we have stated should be 
the goal of Panama's maritime administration, after 
this brief overview of the system's legal framework 
we are able to ascertain that there are really no 
major legal changes required in order to improve the 
performance of the fleet. This serves to confirm our 
contention that it is in the field of maritime safety 
administration and employment of national seafarers 
that SECNAVES should place greater emphasis during 
the period 1986-2000.
As regards the developmental goal of achiev­
ing a better maritime administration structure, in 
order to fully comply with international safety and 
pollution standards laid down by IMO, we must signal 
at this stage that the current setup is basically 
sound, as we have mentioned earlier, and that what 
needs to be done is to introduce some new procedures 
for carrying out duties related to casualty investi­
gations and to perfect the new licensing and exami­
nation system that will be formally inaugurated in
November 1985. (See Fig.4.)
The effect of introducing sound procedures 
for conducting casualty investigations will be to 
further improve the image of Panama as a serious 
tonnage operator, a mesaure that will undoubtedly 
gain the acceptance of banks and underwriters from 
all over the world. This should be done in order 
to improve the safety record of the Panamanian fleet
DIRECTORATE GENERAL
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as a way of incentivating new registrations. The 
overriding goal and concern of introducing the 
casualty investigations procedures should remain, 
however, the need to work actively to reduce the 
loss of life and prevent the pollution of the ma­
rine environment that are usually associated with 
vessel casualties.
Other measures that could be introduced 
by SECNAVES as a way of strengthening the Panama­
nian maritime safety administration include mea­
sures to exercise a more effective control over 
classification societies authorized to issue cert­
ificates under international conventions, the imp­
rovement of surveys carried out under the Annual 
Safety Inspection Program, and the fostering of 
training efforts aimed at building up Panama's own 
cadre of surveyors and maritime safety administra­
tors. Reduced manning scales should also be studied.
At the national level, we believe it would 
be convenient to begin considering the feasibility 
of introducing port state control measures contem­
plated under several IMO conventions. In this re­
gard, consideration must be given to the fact that, 
as part of the duties it will be assuming when it 
takes over the Panama Canal in 2000, Panama will be 
required to have this type of operation in place in 
order to cope with high traffic levels and the inc­
reased possibility of marine casualties and pollution 
incidents that this will undoubtedly engender.
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A final recommendation we wish to make for 
implementing our strategic goal of developing Panama's 
national maritime administration, taking advantage of 
the fact that these are times of recession and low 
activity, refers to the need to improve local shipping 
regulations. This could contemplate, for example, 
the adoption of measures to control pollution coming 
from ships transiting our territorial waters en route 
to canal waters, collision regulations for areas with 
high traffic density, and general surveillance mecha­
nisms for the country's exclusive economic zone.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE NATIONAL PORTS
In order to understand ports development in 
the Republic of Panama, it is necessary to underline 
the fact that, despite the existence of numerous 
natural harbours within the national territory, the 
country has had scarce and only recent experience 
in administering ports. This can be traced to sev­
eral reasons. For one, we find that the two main 
deepwater and international ports - Balboa and Cris­
tobal - were under complete US control until the 
1977 Panama Canal Treaties came into force on 1 October 
1979. On the other hand, we find that the other two 
important ports - Armuelles and Almirante - are under 
a concession to the banana-exporting transnational 
Chrigui Land Company. , This leaves us with a better 
appreciation of the situation, if we only realize that 
until some six years ago, only ports of minor traffic 
were under complete Panamanian control.
It is against this background of a young and 
inexperienced national portd administration that we 
must evaluate contemporary ports development in Panama. 
In evaluating this performance, moreover, special care 
must be taken to account for the fact that, as per 
canal treaty provisions, some aspects of the adminis-
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tration of Balboa and Cristobal are still handled 
by the US; these include marine traffic control, 
pilotage and defense in both canal and port waters.
The National Ports Authority (APN), as des­
cribed earlier, is the Panamanian Government agency 
in charge of the country's ports. The institution 
was created on 2 May 1974 by means of Law No. 42, 
as the administrating agency of the national ports 
network as per its stated functions and under the 
guidance of its Board of Directors. In this respect, 
although it would seem advisable to change the cur­
rent administration from a national to a private 
one in the light of the successful examples we find 
in European ports such as Rotterdam, according to 
its enabling legislation the APN's main goals are: 
to promote, guide and plan the governmental policies 
aimed at developing any and all Panamanian ports; 
to build, improve and preserve existing infrastruct­
ure for public commercial use; and to exploit and 
improve ports services offered by the Republic of 
Panama.This means in effect that the APN undertakes 
both developmental and operational functions in the 
same house, a fact that somehow seems to constrain 
the ability of its officials to work on both at the 
same time and with the same degree of success. An 
organization chart of the APN is available in Figure 5 
At the time of this writing, seventeen ports 
of varying sizes and types constitute Panama's ports 
network. At present, however, only Balboa and Cris-
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Fig. 5 .
N A T I ONAL PORTS AUTHORITY
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tobal are the subject of APN attention and this is
due to the fact that in the eyes of the Panamanian
administration, as expressed by APN Director General
Raul Brostella, "the most important thing is to
seek efficiency without sacrificing the historical
33and nationalist value of Balboa and Cristobal."
Until early 1985, all APN actions for the dev­
elopment of these two ports could be found within 
the set of recommendations contained in the "Master 
Plan for the Development of Balboa and Cristobal", 
a study conducted in 1981 by the consulting consor­
tium of LM/TAMS, at the request of the Panamanian 
Government. This Master Plan was prepared on the 
basis of facts collected in 1979, when the ports 
came under Panamanian control, and generally reflects 
a situation characterized by outdated infrastructure.
After having closely followed the Master 
Plan until the early part of this year, by mid-1985 
the APN had decidedly altered its course of action 
in favour a new and ambitious project called "Panama 
Centreport". The project as such was originally out­
lined by Panama's President, Dr. Nicolas Ardito Bar- 
letta, in February 1985, when he created a national 
committee for evaluating its potential and feasibil­
ity .
As we have mentioned in our Strategy, "Panama 
Centreport" is a positive initiative and a challenge 
for Panama. The ambitiousness of the project indi­
cates, on the one hand, a governmental willigness
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to continue fostering Panama's maritime development 
and, on the other, a welcome degree of sensitivity 
towards technological developments in shipping. The 
project is, in essence, another attempt to keep Pa­
nama on the map of the world's principal trading
routes, a second non-marine alternative to the Pana- 
34ma Canal.
What Panama wants to develop is a transporta­
tion alternative known as a land bridge, which arises 
from the ease with which containers can be moved from 
one mode of transport to another during the same voy­
age. Aware of the fact that in a transport system 
consisting of nodes, links and flows, ports are a 
particularly important node lying at the interface 
between the sea and land links, Panamanian authorities 
have conceived the project as a big container trans­
shipment center formed by joining the existing port 
infrastructures of Balboa and Cristobal via the trans­
isthmian railroad and highway*systern, a feat only pos­
sible thanks to the country's geography. The service 
is mainly aimed at benefitting the world's big inter- 
modal operators and the round-the-world container 
transport services.
As outlined up to now, the project seems worth 
while pursuing. In order to go ahead with it, however 
Panama must solve some problems; 1) ensuring a good 
and steady supply of customers; 2) obtaining the fi­
nancing for reconditioning ports, roads and the na­
tional railroad; 3) addressing the problems associated 
with port labour; 4) updating legislation and the ad-
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ministrative procedures for handling customs, health 
and other relevant matters; and generally fitting 
the project within the broader ports and national 
development schemes.
In order to guarantee, in a generic sense,
the steady flow of customers required to ensure an
adequate return on investments, we believe the key
issue will be the reinforcement of Panama's "healthy
climate". The "healthy climate" for Panama would mean
the fostering of maritime personnel, legislation,
development of complementary industries and the coun- 
35try's trade. Much as was done at the txme when Pana­
ma was negotiating the Panama Canal treaties in the 
1970's, it is necessary to show the maritime communi­
ty today that the country is able to offer excellent 
conditions for the development of infrastructure ser- 
vies. The framework for this "healthy climate" that 
we speak about is provided by the national institu­
tions; by laws and the way these laws are interpreted 
in national courts; by_ the types and attractiveness 
of incentives offered to both local and foreign entre- 
prenuers; by the availability of well-trained and 
English-speaking maritime personnel; and by a set of 
well-defined and amply-publicized rules of the game.
It is our contention that the improvement of Panama's 
healthy climate can well be the key to the success or 
failure of the Panama Centreport project.
There is no need here to delve at length with 
the complexities of obtaining financing for maritime
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infrastructure development in today's, world. In the 
case of ports/ the main financial source for develop­
ing countries has been the World Bank for Reconstruct­
ion and Development. Yet, according to Dr. E.G. Frankel, 
Port, Shipping and Aviation Adviser to the World Bank, 
this institution has recently changed its lending prio­
rities; from previous lending policies aimed at finan­
cing new infrastructure, the bank has moved to a policy 
more geared towards maintenance, repair and rehabili­
tation schemes, technical assistance and training, and 
the financing of only solid projects that meet existent 
and future needs, reduce costs and improve the economy 
of the borrowing country. Competition for World Bank
funds is thus increasing, while only US$ SOOmillion
36are available for some 8 to 12 four-year projects.
Still another financial aspect that must be 
considered in connection with the "Panama Centreport" 
project is the possibility of having to resort to the 
granting of private concessions in order to obtain 
the necessary capital. In the course of an informal 
survey carried out by the author among leading econo­
mists and shipping men, including Dr. H.L. Beth and 
Dr. El A. Georgandopoulos, we were able to arrive at 
the preliminary conclusion that it would not be in 
the country's best interest to grant exclusive rights 
for operation of the center to an individual firm or 
consortium. The reasoning behind this conclusion is 
that there would be no guarantee, in the long run, 
that the operator will forever want to stay in Panama;
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the fact that a government must always ensure that 
its options remain open in order to supply the needs 
of future clients; and the fact that in granting 
exclusive rights to one operator the country will 
lose at least part of its usual demand and it may 
not be expected that the concessionaire will be pre­
pared to accept higher compensating dues.
In our opinion, it is essential to deal with 
the port labour aspects of the project at an early 
stage in the planning process. Containerization de­
mands maximum cargo handling efficiency: the greater 
the capital cost of the vessels using the ports (in 
this case, the extremely expensive containerships), 
the more important it is to reduce port turnround 
and the greater is the penalty in terms of increased 
costs because of deficient port services. The use 
of expensive equipment is another trademark of the 
container revolution. In the case of the Panamanian 
project, laboujT-intensiveness should not be encouraged, 
although we fully appreciate the political connotations 
of unemployment. Introducing more labour than is ne­
cessary at the quayside is a very expensive way of 
getting off the ground with the "Panama Centreport" 
project. Of course, the idea would be for the pro­
ject to generate enough spin-off jobs in ancillary 
industries so as to absorb any redundant or new la­
bour .
Another aspect of the port labour issue is . 
that of training. Special and careful consideration 
must be given to the training of selected personnel
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in port management and operations, perhaps through 
the sponsoring of UNCTAD courses or of courses pre­
pared by local experts in shipping and transport 
economics. There is a need for Panama to increase 
national participation in the production and supply 
of port and other services to shipping, but this can 
only be effected via the training of personnel in 
charge of lending those services. Some examples of 
more formal training in port activities can be found 
in the port of Rotterdam and in the Port Workers' 
Training Institute attached to the Arab Maritime Trans­
port Academy of Alexandria, Egypt.
The question of updating legislation and in­
troducing changes into documentary procedures for 
customs, immigration, health and other national con­
trol activities is of extreme importance. Building 
infrastructures that are extremely costly only to have 
the trade flow stopped because some customs inspector 
insists on opening a container is a development that 
must avoided at all costs. So many changes are being 
introduced in this field that it is the subject of 
many international gatherings of commercial lawyers 
and many other international conventions and recommend­
ations'. The Chase Manhattan Bank is even in the pro­
cess of putting into operation, by the end of this 
year, a revolutionary system for the centralization 
of documents used in usual transportation arrangements: 
SEADOCS. As outlined, the system will do much to imp­
rove the problems associated with bills of lading and 
normal trading.
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When we speak about fitting the "Panama Centre- 
port" project within the overall framework of ports 
and other development schemes, we are talking basic­
ally about the second of the development goals we have 
outlined in our Strategy for national maritime develop­
ment in Panama. We can never overemphasize the need 
for project developers to keep always in mind the needs 
of Panamanian importers and exporters and of the coun­
try's foreign trade. Although there is no organiza­
tion such as a shippers' council or freight booking 
bureau in Panama, port users can voice their opinions 
via strong and reputable organizations such as the 
Sindicato de Industriales de Panama (Panamanian Ind­
ustrialists' Union -SIP) and the Asociacion de Usua- 
rios de la Zona Libre de Colon (Association of Users 
of the Free Zone of Colon - AU) and it can be said 
that they have actively lobbied in favour of more ef­
ficient and cheaper port services.
The role of Panamanian ports in the develop­
ment of Panama's hinterland has not been adequately 
contemplated thus far. In a country where most of 
the export industries are located outside the peri­
meter of the principal urban centers, it would seem 
wise to take a closer look at the possibility of imp­
roving ports infrastructures in strategic areas of 
the country. This, in our opinion, could serve not 
only the need of Panama's exports, but also the real 
need that exists for the Panamanian hinterland to be 
connected to the urban centers via as many links as
possible, to ensure a more balanced regional and 
social integration of the country.
From the point of view of importers and 
exporters, as we have pointed out earlier, the 
goal of developing other national ports could of­
fer an alternative solution to some of the port 
problems that they are currently facing and which, 
we have every reason to believe, will probably be 
aggravated and not solved by the new port develop­
ment project for Balboa and Cristobal. AU spokes­
man Wellington Fung has indicated that 75 per cent 
of all cargo handled in these two ports is somehow 
connected to the operations of the Free Zone of 
Colon, the second largest in the world after Hong 
Kong. Being the main users, Fung argues, they bear
the brunt of costs and of existing deficiencies in
37port operations.
SIP President George Richa has pointed out
another angle of the problem:
We, the Panamanian industrialists, cannot export 
competitively, since the cost of cargo handling 
and freight rates weigh too heavily on the cost 
of the Panamanian goods. Since the country fully 
imports raw materials, products with an aggregate 
national value receive a double impact....In the 
last report submitted by the Caribbean Basin Ini­
tiative, Panama appears as the country with the 
greatest deficit in exchange with the United 
States.38
Following along the lines of our argument, it 
seems inevitable to ask how does the ports develop­
ment scheme being espoused by the APN fit within the 
national development strategy. Obviously, in this 
connection we must bear in mind that projected income
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and job figures do not give a complete picture of 
the potential impact of the scheme on other national 
maritime activities.
The impact of both the "Panama Centreport" 
project and of other port developments in Panama 
should be basically evaluated against the background 
of both maritime ancillary industries and the Pana­
ma Canal. The former we shall discuss, albeit in a 
brief manner, in a separate chapter. Yet here we do 
want to make a general comment regarding the impact 
that ports development in Balboa and Cristobal'can 
have on Canal traffic and revenue levels. Panama is 
treaty-bound to ensure the optimum operation of the 
waterway, including the adoption of all measure ne­
cessary to make it profitable and efficient. Ideally, 
the implementation of the "Panama Centreport" project 
should not take away tonnage from the canal, but ra­
ther attract new tonnage towards its waters, possibly 
the small feeder containerships that will be undoubt­
edly making the trip from Panama to other areas of 
Latin America and back, as well as the huge round- 
the world containerships now in operation.
Before we conclude our consideration of ports 
development for Panama's future, it is essential to 
say a word of caution. Although the "Panama Centre- 
port" project is essentially a sound one and we would 
expect to see it turn into a reality in the near fu­
ture, we feel that there is one pre-requisite for 
success that our policy-makers have seemingly over-
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looked: the cooperation or/ at least/ the tacit 
acceptance of, the project on the part of other 
Latin American states. Ruling out the more ambi­
tious possibility of integrating port services 
at the regional level/ as seems sound in view of 
the market limitations present in the countries 
of the area/ this acceptance of the Panamanian 
project must be forthcoming at some stage or ano­
ther/ but preferably early on/ so as to avoid any 
controversies that could throw the project into 
trouble afterwards.
A final comment we wish to make is directly 
related to policy-making in the container era. Here 
we feel it is worth remembering Dr/ Frankel's dictum 
that "containerization 'is obsolete" and that modern 
port administrators must "move away from short-term 
operations management to long-term strategic manage­
ment.^^For Panama/ this means a thorough and first- 
ever evaluation of the country's real and potential 
needs/ as well as an analysis of the shipping scene 
today and a projection of that situation into the 
future. Panamanian ports development/ and especially 
the "Panama Centreport" project/ should not be an 
exercise in "tagging along"/ just to end up with "more 
of the same" type of ports infrastructure that every 
other nation has or its trying to have, in a fruit­
less effort to imitate ports developments in developed 
nations that are now already a quarter of a century 
old. It would be worthwhile/ instead/ to try thinking
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basically in tomorrow, such as the Japanese Transport 
Ministry has done when preparing its plans for Japa­
nese ports development in the next century. We hope 
that this chapter will have at least impressed this
fact upon our readers.
CHAPTER SIX
MARITIME ANCILLARY INDUSTRIES
It has been argued by many authors that, in
order to realize the full role, function and impact
of maritime activities on the national socio-economic
structure, it is necessary to review and study not
only key infrastructure and activities, but also the
host of related or support industries that are cond-
4 0ucted in neighboring areas to serve them. In the 
case of Panama this seems specially important, since 
we have earlier indicated the existence of more than 
ten such industries that derive their existence from 
the operations of the Panama Canal, the ports of Bal 
boa and Cristobal, and the open registry fleet. Un­
der this heading, then, we refer to the following:
(1) cargo handling, (2) lighterage, (3) transporta­
tion, (4) warehousing, (5) the Free Zone of Colon,
(6) shiprepairs and shipbuilding, (7) ship stores 
and supplies, (8) bunkering, (9) shipping operations 
(10) ship agencies, (11) freight forwarding, (12) 
banking, (13) commerce, (14) telecommunications, and
(15) tourism.
For most of these activities, at we have ind 
icated before, we have not been able to gather pre­
cise figures or other hard performance indicators.
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Given the fact that, generally speaking, the total
export of goods and services (basically to the Canal
41area) reaches around 40 per cent of the GDP, and 
considering also the huge volume of traffic generat­
ed by the ports and the canal, for which figures are 
available herein, we are able to arrive at a better 
idea of their relative importance within the frame­
work of the national maritime sector. However, inde­
pendently of the fact that data is not available, 
there are some concepts regarding these industries 
and activities and the way they can be improved with 
in the framework of our strategy that we would like 
to express here.
As regards cargo handling, lighterage, trans 
portation, warehousing and freight forwarding, we 
wish to underline two aspects that we consider cru­
cial. First we have the issue of personnel, and the 
need to generally and quickly improve training, re­
cruitment and management policies with the overall 
aim of increasing productivity and streamlining port 
operations. Second, improvements in road, rail and 
storage infrastructure and facilities should be inc­
orporated into either ports or public works budgets, 
mainly in the light of current work volumes and of 
the projected expansion of port activity that will 
be generated via the "Panama Centreport" project. An 
area of special priority should be trucking, road 
and rail haulage, which seems to be deficient today. 
Both training and infrastructure development schemes
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should, in our opinion, reflect real needs and fea­
sible growth projections, but should also address 
the main issue of the need to respond to container­
ization handling with greater efficiency.
The Free Zone of Colon is a major activity 
in Panama, generating close to US$ 50 million annual­
ly by way of salaries, taxes and charges levied on 
companies operating there, and the import and proces­
sing of raw materials for re-exportation^^Because 
this activity has been severely hit by the economic 
burden of Latin America's huge foreign debt and the 
consequent reduction in the purchasing power of the 
countries of the area, its main clients, great efforts 
should be made to widen the market via: (1) a revision
of current legislation to strengthen investment pro­
motion, (2) a revision of existing infrastructures 
and facilities to ensure an adequate provision of ba­
sic services and specially telecommunications and 
optimum port operations, (3) the setting aside of 
areas for future expansion.
The shiprepairing industry we have discussed 
earlier, although briefly, indicating that it is an 
activity with what we consider to be an enormous po­
tential for quick growth with minimum efforts. In 
Panama there are currently two small shipbuilding 
yards that work only on small craft and fishing ves­
sels and which are now operating on a very low pro­
file because of certain problems associated with 
the fishing industry. These two yards, even though
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small/ could be revived if adequate measures are 
taken to promote fishing activities, as has been 
suggested in our Strategy for the fishing sector.
With respect to shiprepair yards, on the other hand, 
we have already discussed the slow and steady growth 
of ASBA over the past three years. Now we must men­
tion the existence of another small yard at Samba 
Bonita, on the Atlantic side, near Cristobal, which
can accomodate small ships, fishing vessels and
43recereation craft. For these two yards we propose 
the re-introduction of a previous clause contained 
in the US Code of Federal Regulations, whereby ships 
transiting the canal in ballast, just with the pur­
pose of undertaking repairs at these facilities, 
would be afforded special tolls treatment. This single 
action, if adopted, could credibly augment the levels 
of activity of both yards in a relatively short period 
of time.
Activities relating to the transit of ships 
through the Panama Canal, viz., ship stores and sup­
plies, bunkering, shipping operations, ship agencies 
and telecbmraiinlcations, are doing generally well, 
except in the case of bunkering, where numerous com­
plaints have been voiced by shipowners because of 
the extremely high price of bunkers in Panama, despite 
the fact that there is a refinery operating in Bahia 
Las Minas, on the Atlantic coast of the isthmus. In 
our opinion, attention should be given to the bunker­
ing problem in the very short run since, considering
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the overall cost structure of shipping operations, 
where bunkers command a preeminent role, Panama would 
be best off by attempting to serve its shipowner clients 
through a welcome reduction in the price of the bunkers 
and fuel available in such a strategic location. Also 
in this connection, it must be pointed out that this 
problem of the high cost of bunkers reduces Panama's 
competitiveness vis-a-vis other neighboring ports and 
could become a significant factor working against the 
success of,the "Panama Centreport" project we are ad­
vocating herein.
Also as part of the above group of industries, 
we wish to mention the fact that Panama's brand new 
shore radio station, PANAMA INTELMAR RADIO (HPP) is 
an excellent addition to the existing network of top- 
quality telecommunications services available in the 
country and that the Panamanian authorities should 
make every effort possible to advertise its existence 
to the shipping community and specially to canal users.
Banking as a leading activity in Panama also 
merits special mention here. Last July was the fif­
teenth anniversary of Panama's highly successful bank­
ing law (Cabinet Decree 237 of 16 July 1970) whereby 
an international banking center was created in Panama. 
As of the date of this writing, there are 122 banks
operating in Panama under three different licenses:
45local, international and general.
Although these banks do not generally support 
shipping or maritime services per se, their existence
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in the country does mean the presence of capital 
and the possibility of making some of this capital 
available for financing investments in maritime- 
related activities.in the future. The banking cen­
ter does today lend support to Panama's great com­
mercial and trading activities, a fact that indicates 
that it is playing a significant role in the national 
maritime development, inasfar as it sustains the vast 
majority of the operations of the ancillary industries 
under discussion in this chapter. Jn a broader sense, 
however, we wish to highlight the fact that the pres­
ence of a highly sophisticated and international ind­
ustry like banking, in Panama, presupposes the exist­
ence of a favourable climate for foreign investments, 
.one of the crucial elements of the "healthy climate" 
that we consider vital to an integral development of 
the national maritime sector. And this, in turn, is 
another indicator of the' great possibilities that are 
opening up for Pan.ama for an effective transfer of 
technology aimed at improving competitiveness in the 
highly complex, capital-intensive, international and 
risky maritime world.
A final comment in this chapter refers to 
tourism and commerce, two mainstays of Panamanian 
economic activity. With respect to both of them we 
wish to emphasize the need to promote tourism and 
attract to our cities and countryside the large a- 
mounts of passengers and crewmembers that transit 
through Panama, specially the market of cruise ves-
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sels (in which Panama has, by the way, displaced Nor 
way as the major flag). Suggestions in this regard 
could probably be best framed by hotel and tourist 
experts, but we are sure that an improvement in the 
transportation services to/from the port areas to 
the cities/interior of Panama; the promotion of one/ 
half day sightseeing tours; the promotion of longer 
package tours for visiting parts of the interior of 
the country, especially islands and mountain regions 
the education of the local public as to what tourism 
is and means to our economy; and, generally speaking 
a more commercially-oriented and exploited tourism 
policy could place Panama among the top beneficia­
ries of this industry worldwide.
Finally, in concluding this chapter, we are 
inclined to state that, within the framework' of 
the overall development strategy goals that we have 
proposed in this dissertation, we attach great pos­
sibilities for a relatively rapid growth to the act­
ivities we have considered here under the heading 
of maritime ancillary industries and that, provided 
conditions for private investments remain as condu­
cive as they have been up to now, these activities 
should be the spearhead of progress in the field.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE FISHING INDUSTRY
Although traditionally a fishing nation, per­
haps due to the reduced internal market and the con­
centration of exports around shrimp and a few select 
ed fish species, the fishing industry in Panama has 
grown, but not to the degree that one would have ex­
pected in a country blessed with a very long coast­
line and rich ocean waters. As a matter of fact, it 
should be noted here that the current performance of 
this activity, although good when compared to other 
maritime activities, could be greatly improved through 
a better understanding of the potential awaiting the 
country in this field.
In an earlier overview of the national mari­
time sector of Panama we provided the key indicators 
of the performance of the fishing industry. In it we 
highlighted the existence of an export-oriented ind­
ustry that represents about the same revenues as the 
open registry fleet, a fact that often goes unnoticed. 
In that overview we also indicted that the industry 
is a major source of employment and that close to a 
quarter of a million Panamanians depend on it, per­
haps the best measure of its importance.
The main problems confronting Panama's fish­
ing industry today can be characterized as follows:
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(1) the need to modernize fishing legislation and 
to place it within the framework of UNCLOS III# and
(2) the need to work on ways to increase the catch 
effort, diversify the fleet structure and improve 
its competitiveness in international markets, and 
to broaden the local consumption habits and thus 
widen the opportunities for domestic use of Panama's 
ocean resources.
As it is currently organized, the fishing 
industry in Panama has three main actors: the govern­
ment, through the Directorate of Marine Resources; 
the shipowners, through the National Association of 
the Fishing Industry (ANDELAIPP); and fishermen, 
through sveral unions. These three parties work, 
however, under rather harmonious conditions, perhaps 
by virtue of the fact that the government agency in 
charge of supervising fishing exploitation in Pana­
ma has played a very succesful role as mediator and 
as coordinator of the national efforts aimed at inc- 
creasing the benefits that the country derives from 
the extensive resources it has in this area.
The industry has been bent, for more than 
a year now, on the drafting of a new fishing law 
that can allow Panama to benefit from its exclusive 
economic zone and also increase the competitiveness 
of the national industry with respect to other for­
eign fleets and industries.^® Through the proposed 
legislation, which has been revised at a very early 
stage by the author, the industry endeavours to solve
some of the key problems it confronts, and which can 
be summarized as follows: (1) high fuel costs, (2)
increase in the cost of spare parts in the order of 
25% in 1976 and 10% during the last four years; (3) 
reduction in the catch and export volumes; and (5): 
reduction in the value of exported volumes of fish 
and shrimp.
From the above list we see that an item al­
ready familiar to us with respect to ancillary ind­
ustries reappears: the high cost of fuel. This prob­
lem, in our opinion, should be dealt with in the man­
ner generally prescribed earlier, although we would 
also favour the introduction of a special, temporary 
subsidization measure to help fishing operators in 
the short run, while more effective and healthier ways 
are institutionalized via the proposed fishing legis­
lation now in the making. This temporary subsidy could 
take one of several forms, although we would be inclin­
ed to adopt some form of tax break.
On the subject of the fleet, as we have ex­
plained above, the main objective should be to revise 
its overall performance, diversify it with respect to 
ship types, in order to be able to catch other types 
of fish, and then work hard on both catching and sel­
ling the catch in carefully selected markets abroad.
Yet it must be borne in mind at all times that such a 
strategy for the fleet can only be successful provided 
the new legislation is able to correctly reflect the 
potential opened up by UNCLOS III and to translate it
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into coherent, workable policies.
Finally, as regards local consumption of 
fish products and the reduced size of the local mar­
ket, we would want to underscore the point that it 
would in Panama's best interest to tackle both these 
aspects with great seriousness, in the light of the 
varied and significant efforts being undertaken in 
many nations to do the same, and to teach the popu­
lation to eat fish, an excellent source of protein 
and one that would be available to Panamanians ea­
sily and cheaply, if exploited in a good way. Here, 
we find that the examples of research and .•advanced 
development programs in fishing such as exist in Por­
tugal and several other European and Asian countries
are worth studying.
A final comment we wish to make with respect 
to the fishing industry in Panama refers to the need 
to both reinforce the technical staff of the govern­
ment agency in charge of supervising its development 
and of the personnel working in the industry. This 
training component , as we have pointed out elsewhere 
in our Strategy, assumes paramount importance in the 
case of Panama's fishing industry, which needs to be 
developed along the lines of modern technological 
and scientific advances, if it is to ensure an ade­
quate food supply, export revenues and technological
transfer .
St
.e
i'A
Tl
O
iN
j 
IN
 
f
e
b
t
Fig.6.
P R O F I L E  OF T H E  P A N A M A  C A N A L
t--------- 1--------- L60 4S 46
W«6H tide +11.54
uovo Tjos-ii.ie
-4-as _I_______  i-36 MluCS #o
X .
IS
±.I« J ______________ J.s  O
HICH TIDE + I .f t0  
LOW TlOG -  l .ZS
Fig. 7 .
P A N A M A  C A N A l  C O M M I S S I O N
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE PANAMA CANAL
Exactly six years after the entry into force 
of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties for the Panama Canal 
of 1977, the "Eighth Marvel of the World" (See Fig­
ure 6), its administration can proudly boast an ex­
cellent operating condition, a high transit capacity, 
a speedier transit service, an outstanding safety 
record, and an overall harmonious working environment. 
This is, in our opinion, an outstanding achievement 
for the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) mainly because 
it signifies the stabilization of potentially detri­
mental emotional conflicts and the consolidation of 
conscientious efforts directed at implementing treaty 
provisions in the best manner possible.
Despite a downturn in traffic levels during 
1983 and 1984, basically due to worldwide recession 
and the opening of the trans-isthmian oil pipeline, 
the PCC has recently announced that there has been 
a modest recovery in traffic levels during the first 
half of 1985. As seen in Table 3, traffic project­
ions made by the administration for the years until 
1987 are the following: 11,730 oceangoing transits 
and US$303 million in tolls revenues in Fiscal Year 
1985; 11,965 transits and US$310 million in tolls in
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Fiscal Year 1986; and 12,085 transits and US$315 
million in tolls during Fiscal Year 1987.^ "^
Under its current administrative set-up (see 
Figure 7 ), and as per the provisions of the 1977 
treaties on the Panama Canal, the mainstay of PCC 
policy os to provide•efficient and economic transit 
services to inernational shipping, while at the same 
time meeting statutory requirements to work on a 
break-even basis. In order to achieve this, until 
now the PCC has invested heavily in canal maintenance, 
improvement and training programs, all of which have 
proven justifiable and successful thus far. As regards 
canal maintenance and improvements, it is worth noting 
that thanks to to such programs, there has been a re­
duction in the time spent by ships in canal waters, 
a good indicator of canal efficiency. An expensive, 
long-term project now being studied is the widening 
of the Culebra (Gaillard) Cut, the narrowest part of 
the waterway, and also of the entrances to the canal, 
which are now limited to 500 feet. Several feasibi­
lity studies and forecasts have also been commissioned, 
as well as an independent analysis of the elasticity
A Oof tolls and of the demand structure until 2010.
Aside from t^e great emphasis that the canal 
administration has placed on keeping the waterway in 
optimum ope rating conditions and e ve n to try to make 
it remain a viable option for transport users in the 
future, special mention must be made here of the ef­
forts undertaken also by the PCC in the field of
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training for Panamanians. Consonant with treaty 
spirit and specific provisions for the increased 
participation of Panamanian nationals in all canal 
activities, found in Article 1 of the Panama Canal 
Treaty of 1977, the canal administration "is now 
spending over US$5 million annually on training 
programs designed to meet present and future needs 
in both technical and administrative areas." As a 
direct result of such efforts, "Panamanians now com­
pose over 77 per cent of the canal's work force, 
and Panamanian participation has increased signific­
antly in the higher skilled jobs, including supervi- 
4 9sory positions. A very special development has been 
the constant fostering of training programs for Marine 
Bureau personnel, considered to be the most important 
of all canal employees because they are responsible 
for directing and executing the transit function.
In this connection, it is worth underlining 
that, despite budgetary restrictions (since canal 
users are the ones that pay for such services), the 
PCC has invested heavily and consistently on the train­
ing of Panamanians in the areas of tugboat mates and 
masters and of canal pilots. In the latter category, 
a special program entitled "Pilot Understudy Program" 
was set up in July 1983 to accomodate Panamanian of­
ficers that did not meet the usual requirements for 
pilot apprentices,i.e., to hold a Chief Mate or Master 
ticket, because of problems with the placement of Pa­
namanians that we have discussed earlier. This pro- -
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gram already produced its first nine graduates, all
50Panamanians, on 15 March 1985 , who have since joined
the pilot force to make the number of Panamanian pilots 
rise to twenty-nine.
A more recent development that likewise serves 
to strengthen PCC training efforts for marine person­
nel is found in the recent formation of the Marine 
Training Unit. This unit will coordinate all PCC ef­
forts to train new Panama Canal pilots, towboat mas­
ters, marine engineers, seamen, launch operators and 
deckhands. The new unit is envisaged as an upward 
mobility program, since it may serve also to train 
the canal's future managers and senior administrators, 
who will require solid knowledge of the canal's tech­
nical and operational features.
After speaking succinctly about PCC adminis­
tration and training programs, which we find to be 
in an excellent overall situation, we wish now to 
elaborate at some length on what we consider to be 
the most crucial issue confronting, not only the wa­
terway, but the Panamanian nation itself. This is 
the study of the marine and non-marine transportation 
alternatives to the current Panama Canal, a study 
mandated by the new treaties (themselves, which state 
under Article XII that
1. The United States of America and the Republic 
of Panama recognise that a sea-level canal may be 
important for international navigation in the fu­
ture. Consequently, during the duration of this 
Treaty, both Parties commit themselves to study 
jointly the feasibility of a sea-level canal in 
the Republic of Panama, and in the event they det-
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ermine that such a waterway os necessary, they 
shall negotiate terms, agreeable to both Parties, 
for its construction. ...3. The Republic of Panama grants to the United 
States of America the right to add a third lane 
of locks to the existing Panama Canal. This 
right may be exercised at any time during the 
duration of this Treaty, provided^that the United 
States of America has delivered to the Republic 
of Panama copies of the plans for such construct­
ion. 51
Consideration of alternatives to the Panama 
Canal is, in our opinion, not only a worthwhile but 
also a necessary task. It represents a mature way 
of confronting technological change and of attempt­
ing to cope with it for the benefit of the entire 
nation. And, in a very big and essential way, it is 
a way of letting Panamanians look at themselves, in 
the historical perspective that we once spoke about 
here, to revise the path trodden and to evaluate our 
experience with the canal. This issue, which is per­
haps too close to our hearts still, and a memory too 
recent to dispel, is one that must be resolved before 
the country can effectively move ahead. What I re­
fer to here is the need for Panamanians to get away 
from the mentality that Panama must eternally be 
equated with a canal, and for them to understand that 
what is ours, to keep and exploit and cherish forever, 
is our country's enviable geographic position and the 
unique narrowness and geological excellence of our 
isthmus. The latter is our resource, and the former 
just a way of making use of that resource to benefit 
our people and the world at large.
Consistent with the treaty provisions that 
we have previously quoted/ great progress has already 
been made. Beginning on 30 September 1982, when Pa­
nama and the United States exchanged diplomatic notes 
for the establishment of a joint preparatory commis­
sion that would prepare the groundwork for the fea­
sibility study of the alternatives to the Panama Ca­
nal, studies within the commission have continued.
Also as part of the exchange, the two Parties agreed 
to invite the Government of Japan to partake in the 
work of the commission, in recognition of the fact 
thht Japan is a major user of the waterway.
This past October, the Tripartite Commission 
presented its final report to the governments of the 
two Parties and to the government Japan, for their 
consideration and approval. In the report there is 
a recommendation that the three countries proceed to 
equally share the cost of the feasibility study that 
is required, and which has been valued at US$20 mil­
lion. It is expected that the parties will announce 
their decision on this important matter in the very
near future.
The alternatives to be evaluated range from 
several proposals to modify the present canal to the 
construction of a new sea-level waterway. Not under 
consideration under the scope of the feasibility study, 
but left to the jurisdiction of the Panamanian autho­
rities, are other non-marine alternatives to the canal, 
including pipelines, transshipment centers, a land-
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bridge. As we have pointed out, the Panamanian gov­
ernment is already actively engaged in the considera­
tion of such alternatives, specially in connection 
with the "Panama Centreport" project.
The Sea-Level Canal Alternative
Many in the Republic of Panama and abroad, 
specially in Japan, favour the construction of a 
sea-level canal through the isthmus. Advocates of 
this alternative point out that the present canal 
and its outdated system of locks will soon be obso­
lete. They also indicate that ship sizes have grown 
over the past decades and that the costs for maint­
aining and improving the canal are becoming too high.
Opponents of the sea-level alternative dis­
tinguish several valid arguments against it. The first 
of such arguments is the price tag: US$ 15 billion. 
This amount appears to be, for them and for many of 
the Panamanians, too heavy a burden to place on the 
shoulders of a small nation of just two million inhab­
itants. Furthermore, current traffic levdls do not 
seem to justify the investment and indeed signal a 
doubtful recovery of the invested capital. Finally, 
the possibility of joint financing by Panama, the 
United States and Japan again raises questions of na­
tional sovereignty which always complicate negotia­
tions and partnership arrangements.
Economics of ship size are also used by the 
opponents of the sea-level canal alternative. After
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the oil crisis, the- argue, the tendency towards 
a "jumboization" of vessels has been detained, 
probably forever. The average ship size has been 
stabilized and even tends to move downward, as builders 
and operators favour fuel economy and other means 
of reducing operating costs instead of economies via 
an increase in the size of vessels. Thus, ships 
currently under construction are, on the average, 
able to use the Panama Canal as it exists today or 
with minor improvements. The only notable exception 
are some Japanese vessels bordering the 150,000 dwt 
upper limit for tankers.
Excavating a new sea-level canal is a funda­
mental issue. (See Figure 8). It has been estimated 
that around 2.5 million cubic yards of material will 
have to be removed with the use of not only advanced 
excavating equipments, but also possibly through the 
use of nuclear power. Because of the many immigra­
tion and ecological problems that such a possibility 
entails, this is considered to be a major handicap 
of the alterntive.
As it has been proposed, the sea-level canal 
alternative has several other drawbacks. In this 
sense, it is worht mentioning that its alleged unlim­
ited capacity would not really exist., as there would 
be a need for massive and expensive tidal gates. The 
cities of Panama and Colon, the country's major popu­
lation centers today, would suffer severe economic 
dislocation as a result of being left out of the
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sea-level canal's proposed route (Route 10). A min­
imum of 30,000 people would have to be relocated in 
order to prepare the 500 kms needed for the canal's 
right of way. Almost 15 kms of dams would beirequired 
to contain the waters of Gatun Lake during and after 
construction; these dams would severely limit the 
availability of water for the continued operations 
of the current canalwhile the new one is being built. 
And finally, both the Inter-American Highway and the 
newly-built Arraijan-La Chorrera Highway would be 
cut off by the sea-level waterway and this would mean 
constructing two new bridges.
"The Panamanian Alternative"
A Panamanian engineer, Roberto Lopez-Fabrega, 
of the engineering firm of Lppez, Moreno y Asociados, 
S.A., has presented a new alternative to the Panama 
Canal. Because of its ingenuity and of the fact that 
it has both a lower price tag and no unsurmountable 
political, economic or ecological complications, the 
so-called "Panamanian Alternative" is now being wide­
ly discussed in Panama and favoured by many, ourselves 
included.
"The Panamanian Alternative" can be summarized 
as follows: that a new locks canal built around the 
existing route is a better alternative than a sea-level 
canal because it takes advantage of excavations already 
made and also of the abundant rainfall in the Isthmus.
Proponent .Lopez Fabrega has prepared a study, though
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not a formal feasibility study, to highlight the 
main aspects of his proposal and to hint at the 
feasibility of increasing the present canal's capa­
city to accomodate.ships of up to 250,000 dwt (or 
150,000 dwt with Phase I) through an expansion and 
deepening of its channel, the addition of a third 
set of locks, and the recycling of water from its 
basin. Figures 9, 10 and 11 illustrate the propo­
sal more clearly.
According to engineer Lopez Fabrega, in 
order to make the projectifeasible, it is necessary 
to lower the elevation of Gatun Lake from 85 to 55 
feet. The Pedro Miguel Locks and the upper chamber 
of the Gatun Locks would have to be eliminated. Other 
major works involved in order to make the proposed 
new locks canal include the widening and deepening 
of the whole navigable channel? the construction of 
Trinidad Dam; and the deviation of the Indio River 
towards Lake Trinidad. Yet the entire project can 
be undertaken and completed, according to the propo­
nent, without interrupting ships transits through 
the current canal, except for a brief period in the 
final stage, when the level of the lake is lowered.
Excavation works that must be undertaken for 
the construction of the new locks canal involve some 
800 million cubic yards of material, mostly of soft 
consistency. Ac omparison in excavation volumes is 
available herein. According to Lopez Fabrega, the 
sea-level canal would entail an excavation volume of
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Fig . 9.
Source: Manfredo y Lopez Fabrega. "El Canal de Panama;
Alternativas para el Futuro. 1982.
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Fig. 10.
Source; Manfredo y. Lopez Fabrega. "El Canal de Panama;
Alternativas para el Futuro". 1982.
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3.1 times as great as that for ;'The Panamanian Alt­
ernative " .
As far as costs are concerned, there is just 
no comparison. "The Panamanian Alternative" has been 
estimated at a total cost of US$3.5 billion (in 1981 
figures), divided along the following lines; US$ 2 
billion for excavation, US$ 1 billion for locks, US$100 
million for Trinidad Dam, US$100 million for deviating 
the Indio River, and US$ 300 million in dams and other 
expenses.
Finally, a general comparison between the two 
principal alternatives clearly shows the advantages 
of "The Panamanian Alternative". Cost advantages re­
quire no elaboration. Some land could be recovered
if a new locks canal is built, vis-a-vis the need to
2adjudicate an additional 500 kms of land for the 
sea-level canal, aside from lands for the relocation 
of those inhabiting the adjudicated lands. The extens­
ive infrastructures that already exist could be used 
for the locks canal alternative, whereas ifwould have 
to be newly built in the case of the sea-level canal 
option. With "The Panamanian Alternative", current 
employment levels could be maintained. And, at the 
end, there are no unpredictable and potentially dis­
astrous ecological consequences to worry about.
107
NOTES
Republica de Panama/Ministerio de Planifi- 
cacion Polltica Economica, Estrategia Para el Desa- 
rrollo Nacional, 1970-80 (Panama: litho-Impresora 
Panama,S.A./ June 1978), p. 22.
2Ibid.,p.2 8.
3For a full description of Panamanian ports 
movement in colonial times, see "los Puertos y el 
Movimiento Portuario en Panama Viejo" and "El Puerto 
de Panama y el Comercio Interregional del Pacifico" 
in Panama-Diario La Prensa, Enciclopedia de la Cultu- 
ra Panamena para Ninos y Jovenes 32 (September 1985); 
2-6 .
Ministerio de Planificacion, Estrategia,p.34. 
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p.35.
7Nagendra Singh, International Maritime Law 
Conventions, 4 vols. (London;Stevens & Sons,1983)4: 
2845 .
8Ibid.,p.2847
Rodney Carlisle, Sovereignty for Sale (Anna­
polis: Naval Institute Press,1981),p.1.
10
11
Ibid.,p.20. 
Ibid.,p.3 7.
12Carlos A. Lopez-Guevara, "Panama’s Fleet Cont­
inues its Upward Trend", Panamanian Ship, September 
1983,p.2.
13
14
Panamanian Ship , July 1985,p.2 
Idem., December 1984,p.l.
15Idem , March 1985,p.1.
16Idem, July 198 5 ,p.8.
17
18
19
20
Ibid., 
Idem., 
Idem., 
Idem.,
p.6,11.
March m985,pp.1,11. 
November 1984, p.3. 
January 1985, p.4.
108
21International Ocean Institute, Law of the
S e a _ I n t r od u c t o r y,_M a t e r i a 1 s , September 1985, pp. vi- 
vi ii.
22,
23
'Panamanian Ship, July 1985, p.2. 
Idem., May 1985,p.2.
^International Maritime Organization, PAN/ ZiZ0 0 ission_Report_by_MaX_Tiedemann, November 1979,
p . 12 .
p. 156
25
26
B.N. Metaxas, The Economics_of_Tram£_Shipp_in£,
Panamanian Ship, March 1984,p.2
27
28
Ibid
29
30
Ibid.,pp.7,13.
Idem., March 1985,p.5.
For an excellent account of Panama's new mort­
gage law, see Panamanian Ship, January 1985,pp.9,11.
31Panama Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro, Leyes
y_Re £^ame n t op_d e_ ].£_M ap^n a_Me £c a n t e_ (Panama:Centro Internacional de Estudios Empresariales,1984) 
pp.6 4-7 8 .
3 2 . For a full description of ports administra­
tion in Panama, see Autoridad Portuaria Nacional, In- 
forme Anual 1981.
33
34
Panamanian Ship, February 1985,p.l. 
Idem,, August 1985 ,p.12.
^^Ahmed Abdel-Monsef, Lectures_on_the_Estab1ish- 
ment of a National Shipping Industry in a Developing 
Country, 1984, p.lOO.
E.G. Frankel, "Port Operations and Management, 
Including Efficiency and Safety", IMO Seminar for Heads 
of National Maritime Administrations, August 1985,
37Panamanian Ship, February 1985,p.9
38Ibid.
^Frankel,"Port Operations and Management".
^*^Excellent explanations of the need to develop 
full maritime infrastructures and services in developing 
countries are available in: El A. Georgandopoulos,"Dev­
elopment of Maritime Infrastructure", WMU Lecture Notes, 
August 1984; Ahmed Abdel-Monsef, "Lectures on the 
Establishment of a National Shipping Industry in a 
Developing Maritime Country", WMU Lecture Notes,1984;
109
and J. Bathurst, "The Role of Ports in Economic Dev­
elopment", UNCTAD Manual on Port Management I (UNCTAD 
Secretariat, March 1975),pp. 35-46.
p.2854.
p i de Planf icacion , Estr ateg^ ia ,p . 59 . 
^^Ibid.,p.69-70.
^^Panamanian Ship, March 1985, pp.1,11.
^^Idem., May 1985, pp.1,11.
^^La Gaceta Financiera, 29 July 1985. 
^^Panamanian Ship, January 1985,p.4.
^”^idem. , May 1985 ,p.4.
^®Ibid.
^^Idem., April 1985, p.4.
*^^ Idem., March 1985 , p.4.
^^Singh. International Maritime Law Conventions, 
^^Fernando Manfredo and Roberto Lopez Fabrega,E1 _ C a n a l_d e_P a n a m a j__ A11 e £n a t e s _£ a£ a_e 1_F u t u r o, Sep­
tember 1982 .
110
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdel Wahab, Farouk. Suez Canal Authority. Ismailia, 
Egypt. Interview. 10 March 1985.
Alderton, Patrick M. Sea Transport;Operations and
Econom^c^. London;Thomas Reed Publications/
l980T”
Amos, Herman. Shipping Conferences. Deventer/Nether­
lands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers,
1983 .
Autoridad Portuaria Nacional. Informe Anual 1981.Pa- 
nama, 1981.
Balmer, Thomas. "Introduction to the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certifi­
cation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,1978". 
Malmo, World Maritime University Lecture 
Notes, 1984.
Bauchet, Pierre. L'Economie du Transport International 
de Merchandises, Air et Mer. Paris: Ed. Eco­
nomica ,1982.
Beth, Hans L.,ed.Conference_Report-Internationa1_Sym- 
posium on Liner Shipping III. Bremen: Insti­
tute of Shipping Economics and Logistics,1984.
Blaaw. H.G. et al., "Applicability of Simulation Models 
in Design of Ports in Developing Countries". 
Malmo, WMU Lecture Notes, 1985.
Carlisle, Rodney. Sovereignty for Sale. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press,1981.
Cowley, James. "National Administration for Safety and 
Pollution Prevention Control". IMO Seminar on 
Survey and Certification: Tokyo, Ocotber 1980.
Creedy, John and Thomas, Barry, ed.. The Economics of 
Labour. London: Butterworth Scientific & Co., 
1980 .
Duran, Esperanza. ed. , D a ^^n _ Am e jc c a_ a n d _ t h e _ Wop 1 d_ 
Recession. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1985.
Frankel, E.G. "Port Operations and Management, Inclu­
ding Safety and Efficiency". Malmo, IMO Semi­
nar for Heads of National Maritime Administra 
tions, August 1985.
Ill
Georgandopoulos, El A. "Development of Maritime Infra­structure". WMU Lecture Notes,Malmo,1984.
-- .  ."Shipping in Developing Countries."
Malmo, WMU Lecture Notes/1984.
Gold, Edgar. Maritime Transport. Massachussetts:Lexing­
ton Books, D.C. Heath and Company,1984.
Haqberq,Lennart.ed.,Handbook on Maritime Law, 3 vols., 
Deventer/The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxa­
tion Publishers,1983.
Hutchinson, Gillian and Treble, John.ed., Recent Ad-_
Vanc^s_in Labour Economics. London:Croon Helm,
1984 .
International Labour Organization. Convention No.147
Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships. 
Geneva, 19 80 .
International Maritime Organization. International Conf­
erence on the Safety of_Li.^ e_at_S e a 19^ 2£• Lon­don: Spotliswoode Ballantyne Ltd.,1982.
---------------------------------- . PAN/78/003 Mission
5®2 i®SI®nH* London: November 1979.
International Ocean Institute. Law of the Sea Intro­
ductory Materials. Compiled by Aldo E. Chircop. 
Malta,1985.
Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, Bremen.
Hans L. Beth to Ivette de Tejada. 21 August 1985.
Klerck-Nilssen. International Labour Office. Malmo,
Sweden. Interview, 27 August 1985.
La Gaceta Financiera (Panama). 29 July 1985.
Lampe, V.H."Marin.e Personnel". Malmo: WMU Lecture Notes, 
1984 .
La Prensa-Enciclopedia de la Cultura Panamena para Ninos 
y Jovenes (Panama). September,1985.
Liberian Shipowners Council,Ltd. UNCTAD Registration of 
Ships Conference 1984. New York: Liberian Ship­
owners Council, 1984 (Printed).
--------------------- --------- . Draft Document on Min­
imum Manning Levels. New York: Liberian Ship­
owners Council: 11 September 1985.
112
Manfredo, Fernando and Lopez Fabrega, Roberto. "ElCanal de Panama: Alternativas para el Futuro". 
Simposio Maritimo Internacional. Panama/1982 
(Mimeographed).
Martinez; Armando. Direccion General de Recursos Mari­
nos del Ministerio de Comercio e Industries. 
Panama. Interview, 17 January 1985.
Martins, Eduardo. Ministerio do Mar, Direccao Geralda Marinha de Comercio. Lisbon, Portugal. In­
terview, 22 March 1985.
Metaxas,B.N. The Economics of Tramp Shipping. London:
The Athlone Press Ltd., 1981.
Miller, Norman C., ed.. International Reserve_s ,gxghan£e) Rates and_DeVe1opin£-Country_Finance. Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1982.
Ministerio de Comercio e Industrias-Direccion General 
de Recursos Marinos. "Anteproyecto de Ley de 
Pesca". Panama, 1985. (Typewritten).
Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro, Direccion General Con­
sular y de Naves. Panama-Leyes y Reglamentos de 
1 a a £ i n a _J1 e r c a n t e _ 19 2 5 -19 8 4 ^ . Panama: Centro 
Internacional de Estudios Empresariales,1985.
Ministerio de Planificacion y Politica Economics.Est£a- 
teqia para el Desarrollo Nacional 1970-1980^. Pa 
nama, 1978 (Mimeographed).
________________________________________________   El De­
sarrollo Nacional y la Recuperacion de la Zona_ 
del_Canal_de_Panama. Panama,1978. (Mimeographed).
Ministerio de Trabajo y Bienestar Social. Notes Regard­
ing Unemployment in Panama. Panama: 10 October
1983 .
ria 1982-1983. Panama, 1984.
Memo-
Mokhtar G. and Monsef,A. "Research Methods". Malmo: WMU 
Lecture Notes, 1984.
Mokhtar, Gamal. "Maritime Training and Manpower Train­ing in Developing Countries". Malmo, WMU Lecture 
Notes, 1984.
_____________ . Arab Maritime Transport Academy. Alexan
dria, Egypt. Interview, 5. and 14 March 1985.
Monsef, Ahmed A. "Lectures on the Establishing of a Na­tional Shipping_ Industry in a Developing Maritime 
Country". Malmo', WMU Lecture Notes, 1984 .
113
Moreno, Luis H. "La Inversion Extranjera en Panama".Panama. Simposio Maritirao Internacional. Pa 
nama, 1982 .. (Mimeographed).
Panama-Comision Preparatoria para el Estudio de las Aiternativas al Canal de Panama. "Documentos 
de Trabajo". Panama,1983. (Typewritten).
Panama Canal Commission.' Functional Char^ ts. 1983 .
Panamanian Ship (Panama), September 1983 -October 1985.
Sadek, Alphonse. Arab Maritime Transport Academy. Alex­
andria, Egypt. Interview, 4 March 1985.
Singh, Nagendra. International Maritime Law_Convent_io^ .
Foreword by C.P. Srivastava. London; Stevens & 
Sons, 1983.
Singh, G.S. "Merchant Navy and Maritime Personnel". Mal- 
mo, WMU Lecture Notes, 1984.
Srivastava, C.P. "La Situacion Mari'tima Inter nacional: Realidad y Perspectivas". Simposio Maritimo In- 
ternacional. Panama, 1982. (Mimeographed).
Stender, Ernst G. "Ports and Port Safety". Malmo, WMU 
Lecture Notes, 1984.
Stubberud, Gunnar. "Principles of the Law of the Sea". 
Malmo, WMU Lecture Notes, 1984.
Sturmey, Stanley G. The Open Registry Controyersy_and
The Development_Bremen: Institute of
ShTpping Economics and Logistics Bremen. Book 
Series No. 8, 1983.
Tejada, Edgar H. Asociacion Panamena de Oficiales de 
Marina. Panama: Interview, 24-25 May 1985.
The Stateman's Yearbook 1984-1985. Edited by John Pax­
ton. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
Tiedemann, Max. Brunsbuttel, Federal Republic of Ger­
many. Interview, 20 April 1985.
United Nations.. Conference on Trade and Development.
Manual on Port Management. 2 vols. Geneva;
May 1977.
_  , Ma n u a ]-_on_a_Un_i f 6 r ^ m _ S m
of Port Statistics and Performance Indj^ cato£s^. 
Geneva, 1983.
_________________   United Nations Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences. New York:United Nations,1975.
114
--------- ------ . Report of the United Na­
tions Conference on Condition for Registra 
tion of Ships on the Second Part of its 
Session. TD/RS/CONF/15. Geneva: 30 April 198 5 .
--------------- . Texto Refundido de un A-
cuerdo Internacional sobre las Condiciones 
de Matriculacion de Buques. TD/RS/CONP/L.13. 
Geneva: 19 July 1985.
Vanchiswar, P.S. "Maritime Administration and Maritime 
Safety Administration in Developing Countries" 
Malmo: WMU Lecture Notes, 1984.
World Mar i time 
cil of University. Report of the Academic Coun the University. Malmo, 17 June 1985.
